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I. INTRODUCTION
Both Germany and the United States are in the process of substantially
revamping the legal frameworks of their telecommunications industries. On
February 1, 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (1996 Act).' Striving to meet a European Union (EU) deadline,2
the German Parliament passed its new telecommunications law, the
Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG), on July 25, 1996.? Each statute
establishes significant changes in the makeup of the respective industries,
setting the stage for market competition in virtually all sectors of these
telecommunications industries.
Such changes are occurring throughout the world and represent the
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. See German Government Tries to Keep Telecoms Legislation on Track, TELECOM
MARKETS, Apr. 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8688041.
3. Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG), v. 1.8.1996 (BGBI. I S. 1120) (F.R.G.). The TKG,
in German and in English, is posted on the World Wide Web at the German Federal
Ministry for Posts and Telecommunications' web site: <http://www.bundesregierung.de/.bin/
lay/inland/ministerien/post/tkg.html>. Unless otherwise noted, English quotations of the TKG
are taken from the "Telecommunications Act Translation" by the German Federal Ministry
of Posts and Telecommunications. Comparisons of wording between drafts are to the
following: the "June Draft' (Draft from June 5, 1996), contained in BT-Drucksache 13/3609;
the "January Draft" (Draft from Jan. 30, 1996), available on the Internet at <http://userpage
.fu-berlin.de/-stem89/politik/tkg.l.html>; and the "Original Draft" that the Chancellor sent
to the Parliament on Feb. 9, 1996, which is contained in Bundesrat, Entwurf eines Telekom-
munikationsgesetz (TKG), Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 80/96, [Draft of
a Telecommunications Act, Bill of the Federal Government, Circular 80/96] (09.02.96) also
available on the Internet at <http://www.fa-berlin.de/POLWISS/mdb-projekt/tauss/
dokumente/telekom.htrnl>. A Legislative Report [Begriindung] was published along with the
Original Draft of the TKG [hereinafter TKG Legislative Report].
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culmination of what began in the late seventies with the liberalization of the
U.S. equipment market and proceeded with the breakup of AT&T and the
privatization of British Telecom in 1984. The provision of local and long-
distance telecommunications services had previously been viewed as a
natural monopoly. However, based on tremendous leaps in technological
capabilities and changes in thinking regarding national security, telecommu-
nications markets have, over the past twenty years, come to be viewed as
amenable to competition.4 Commentators have argued that, rather than
protecting domestic telecommunications industries, national monopolies
have hindered growth and development in nationalized markets.' Accord-
ingly, nations are striving to improve the competitiveness of their telecom-
munications-sector monopolies and designated dominant providers-whether
private like AT&T, public like British Telecom, or state-owned like the
former Deutsche Bundespost (DBP), the German Federal Postal Service-as
they are converted from public-sector utilities to private operators.
4. For discussion of natural monopoly in telecommunications and changes in thinking,
see, for example, Harald Sondhof & Michael Theurer, Wettbewerb in den lokalen
Fernmeldemdrkten [Competition in Local Telecommunications Markets], WiRTSCHAFT UND
WETTBEWERB (WuW), Mar. 1996, at 177, 179. For discussion of national security concerns,
see, for example, STEVE COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAK UP OF AT&T
186-87, 271-72 (1986) (describing Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's national
security objections to the AT&T breakup); Steven Globerman, Foreign Ownership in
Telecommunications, 19 TELECOMM. POL'Y 21, 22 (1995) (citing Canadian national security
arguments against leaving control over telecommunications to "the rigors of the market").
5. See, e.g., Giinther Knieps, Die Telekommunikation als Gegenstand der Industrie-
politik in Europa, den USA und Japan aus wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Sicht [Telecommuni-
cations as a Subject ofIndustrial Policy in Europe, the USA, and Japan from an Economic
View], in KOMmUNIKATION OHNE MONOPOLE II [COMMUNICATIONS WITHOUT MONOPOLIES]
239, 252 (Ernst-Joachim Mestmiicker ed., 1995) (arguing that European monopolies that are
protected from competition will not be efficient, leading to a poor competitive position that
disadvantages national equipment manufacturers); Bernard Amory, Telecommunications in
the European Communities, EUROPAISCHEs ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (EUZW
HEFT) [EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LAW], Feb. 1992, at 75 (arguing that threat of
rapidly developing United States and Japanese telecommunications industries, resulting from
liberalization, spurred the EC to act); 2 ALFRED EIDENMOLLER, KOMMENTAR, POST- UND
FERNMELDEWESEN [MAIL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS] 26 (1991) (liberalization in other
western countries pushed Germany's deregulation); Teleconglomeration: Why Governments
Should let Foreign Telecoms Giants into their own Backyards, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996,
at 18; EU Telecom Ministers Take Steps Toward European Telecom Deregulation, Reuters
Textline, Agence Europe (German Language Full Text), Mar. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Legnews Library, Curnews File (reporting EU Commission spokesman's observation that
countries with more liberalized telecom sectors have seen tremendous growth in private-
sector telecom jobs and overall benefits to consumers).
6. EIDENMOLLER, supra note 5, at 26. For discussion of the effects of deregulation and
liberalization in the telecommunications markets, see, for example, JILL HILLS, DEREGULAT-
ING TELECOMS 203-06 (1986) (arguing that deregulation has worked to the benefit of big
business and to the detriment of consumers).
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The size of telecommunications markets worldwide and expected
continued growth rates demand liberalization. For example, it is estimated
that the telecommunications market in Germany will grow to Deutsche
Mark (DM) 120 billion by the year 2000.7 The EU estimates that the
telecommunications sector will account for 7 percent of the EU's gross
national product by the year 2000, up from 2 percent in 1984.8 Moreover,
telecommunications costs are estimated to account for 10 percent of Fortune
1000 company budgets.' Accordingly, it is not surprising that countries
want to ensure that their telecommunications infrastructures and legal
systems are able to support this enormous industry.
The TKG, also referred to as Post Reform I, represents the culmina-
tion of a radical overhaul of Germany's telecommunications market, setting
Germany on a course toward the opening of virtually all aspects of the
telecommunications market to competition on January 1, 1998. The
transition in the United States from state-supervised private monopoly to
competition has been piecemeal-beginning with equipment in the 1970s,
moving to long-distance in the 1980s, and finally, with the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, to local exchange markets in the late 1990s. Germany
had earlier opened up its equipment manufacturing and retail markets to
competition, but it is now set to liberalize both long-distance and local
service in one fell swoop. Accordingly, while both are intended to create
similar competitive environments, the particular issues upon which the two
laws focus are different, representing different levels of market develop-
ment.
This Article describes and analyzes five primary subject areas
contained in the TKG. The TKG covers a variety of issues relating to
liberalization of the telecommunications market, but five areas in particular
stand out as primary focal points: licensing, universal service, market-
dominance regulation, interconnection, and rights-of-way. Each area's
treatment in the TKG will be contrasted both with prior German law and
with the current state of U.S. law. However, because of the differences in
the structures and focuses of the respective legal systems and regulatory
priorities, the broad categories do not always lend themselves to simple
7. Christoph Hiltl & Klaus Grofmann, Grundfragen des Neuen Deutschen Telekom-
munikationsrechts [Basic Questions of the New German Telecommunications Law],
ZEITScHRIFr FOR RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFT [JOURNAL FOR LAW AND ECONOMY], Jan. 25,
1996, at 169.
8. REINHARD ELLGER & THOMAS-SONKE KLuTH, DAS WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT DER
INTERNATIONATIONALEN TELEKOMMUNIKATION IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
[ECONOMIC LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY] 239-40 (1992).
9. MICHAEL KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 1.11 (1992).
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comparisons. Because this Article focuses on the TKG, the contents of the
1996 Act will be analyzed only to the extent that it corresponds with the
five identified TKG areas under consideration. European Union telecommu-
nications law is also discussed as it relates to Germany.
Although important, several specific issues that the TKG deals with or
are otherwise relevant as points of comparison with major themes in U.S.
regulation are not addressed. These include the relationship between
telephone service and cable television, 0 technical standards, manufacturing
and sale of equipment, mobile telecommunications, satellite issues, and
rates. World Trade Organization activity in the telecommunications area is
also not discussed.
II. THE STATE OF THE GERMAN AND U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRIES LEADING UP TO 1996
A. Overview
In contrast to the situation in the United States where telecommunica-
tions began with competition and only later became a service of a state-
sanctioned monopoly," in Germany and throughout Europe, telecommuni-
cations service was traditionally supplied by the state--typically, by a
state's Ministry for Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT). This provided a
variety of structural impediments to privatization and liberalization. 2 For
example, the German Constitution itself provided a duty on the part of the
federal state to ensure availability of essential telephone services for the
general population. This constitutional provision prevented privatization and
had to be amended in order to allow privatization to go forward. 3 Also
different is that the German telephone system has functioned as both
provider and regulator. By contrast, provider and regulator functions have
always been legally separate in the United States, though the relationship
between regulators and the regulated was sometimes less than distant.
10. This in particular is a major issue in the United States, as can be seen from its
significant treatment in the 1996 Act. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 250-60 (West Supp. 1996). The
legal status of cable television in Germany and its relationship to the telephone service
market remains extremely murky and the subject of considerable debate at this time.
11. See infra Part II.B.2.
12. For example, because of issues such as how to treat civil servants who work for the
postal service, there was considerable debate over whether to modernize the telecommunica-
tions system on a British private or French public model. Martin Bullinger, Organisations-
formen und Staatsaufsicht in der Telekommunikation [Forms of Organization and State
Control In Telecommunications], in KOMMUNIKATION OHNE MONOPOLE II, supra note 5, at
349, 353.
13. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 87(f) (superseded version) (F.R.G.);
Bullinger, supra note 12, at 349, 350.
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B. The History and Structure of the Industries
1. Germany
Presently, the legal framework for Germany's telecommunications
industry is to a large degree founded upon EU requirements.14
a. EC Telecommunications Legislation-Toward Open Networks
in Europe
Article 90(2) of the European Economic Community Treaty requires
that "[u]ndertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general
economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly
shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those
rules governing competition" '15 The European Commission (Commission)
considers PTTs to fall within the scope of this section.16 Article 90
therefore serves as the primary EU legal foundation for the push toward the
break-up of national telecommunications monopolies and the opening of
markets to competition. Secondarily, however, two EU competition law
provisions are also applicable. Article 85 prohibits agreements between
enterprises or associated groups which are intended to or have the effect of
preventing, inhibiting, or distorting competition within the EU.17 This is
viewed as a potential problem, particularly in European telecommunications
markets because of the tight relationship between the previous state
monopolies and the state governments.' 8 Article 86 prohibits the misuse
of a market dominant position that affects trade within the EU. This is an
14. For example, the contents of the EC's Green Book on Telecommunications figured
prominently in the debates preceding passage of Post Reform I. GUDULA DEIPENBROCK, DIE
DEUTSCHE BUNDESPOST AUF DEM EUROPAISCHEN BINNENMARKT [THE GERMAN FEDERAL
POSTAL SYSTEM IN THE EUROPEAN HOME MARKET] 43 (1991).
The European Union became effective in November of 1993 pursuant to the terms of
the Maastricht Treaty. DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, OFFICE OF PRESS AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE EUROPEAN UNION (1996).
15. TREATY ESTABLISING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C224) 1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 629 (1992) [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
16. NICHOLAS HIGHAM & LEONIE GORDON, EC TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 1.21
(1994). See Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the development of
the common market for telecommunications services and equipment, COM(87)290 final at
A7.9(2) [hereinafter Green Paper] (Articles 85, 86, and 90 lead the list of Treaty provisions
that are relevant for reform of telecommunications markets).
17. GG art. 85 § I (F.R.G.).
18. Brigitte Haar, Markt6ffnung in der Telekommunikation durch Normen gegen Wettbe-
werbsbeschriinkungen [Opening Telecommunications Markets Through Norms Against
Restraints of Competition], in KOMMUNIKATION OHNE MONOPOLE II, supra note 5, at 527,
555-56.
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immediate danger in each European market given the automatic dominance
of former state monopolies, and is similar to that present in the United
States following the break-up of the Bell system.19 Because of the potential
for conflicts in attempts to comply with both EU competition and
telecommunications law, the Commission has issued guidelines stating that
telecommunications legislation is to be interpreted and applied in a way
consistent with EU competition law.2"
In the early 1980s, faced with increasing pressure from other countries
like the United States and Japan to liberalize equipment and services
markets, the Commission began focusing its attention on reforming
European telecommunications markets. Commission policy to this end
moved along two tracks: First, "liberalization," which refers to the breaking
down of national monopolies and the opening of the telecommunications
markets to competition. Second, "harmonization," which refers to the
establishment of a level playing field in the industry that will allow firms
to compete equally throughout the EU in telecommunications goods and
services.2'
While the Commission's interest in reforming the telecommunications
industries within the EC dates back to 1984,22 the impetus for reform
accelerated in 1987 with the issuance of the 1987 "Green Paper" that
proposed how liberalization and privatization of member state telecommuni-
cations monopolies could take place.23 It set forth ten proposed positions
to accomplish:
the development in the Community of a strong telecommunications
infrastructure and of efficient services: providing the European user
with a broad variety of telecommunications services at the most
favorable terms, ensuring coherence of development between Member
States, and creating an open competitive environment, taking full
account of the dynamic technological developments under way.24
The Council endorsed the Green Paper's objectives in its Resolution of June
30, 1988, inviting the relevant bodies of the Community to develop
measures to achieve the goals.
The next significant steps came with the European Commission's
Directives of June 28, 1990, on the liberalization of telecommunications
19. Id. at 555.
20. Application of EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications Sector,
Guidelines. 91/C233/02, para 15. However, these are not binding on the Commission.
HIGHAM & GORDON, supra note 16, § 7.17.
21. Id. §§ 2.2-2.3.
22. Id. § 2.4.
23. See Green Paper, supra note 16.
24. Id.
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services markets and achieving of harmonization via implementation of
open network provisions. The former, the Services Directive,25 according
to the Commission, "has come to be identified as a cornerstone of the EU
framework for liberalizing the European telecommunications market.
' 6
The latter, the Open Network Provision (ONP) Directive, laid the founda-
tion for open access between all networks and carriers.'
The Services Directive required Member States to eliminate special
and exclusive rights in the teiecommunications services sector and to take
the necessary steps to allow entrance to the market.2" The only exception
was voice telephony services. Since 1990 the Commission has adopted a
variety of directives which amend the Services Directive. The timetables in
place for liberalization are: All exclusive and special rights for provision of
telecommunications services, other than for voice telephony, were scheduled
for elimination by July 1, 1996. Exclusive and special rights for provision
of voice telephony must be eliminated by January 1, 1998.29
The Commission's ONP Directive was aimed at Community-wide
harmonization. The Directive required the opening of existing public
networks to competitors, allowing access to all newcomers on equal terms,
including divisions within a network infrastructure provider's own
25. Commission Directive 90/388 of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for
telecommunications services, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 10.
Directives are issued by the Council and the Commission and are addressed to Member
States who are themselves responsible for individually achieving the result intended. EEC
TREATY art. 189(3). Accordingly, there is some flexibility in how each Member State may
implement the Directive. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INsTITUTIONs OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 122 (6th ed. 1993). Each Directive sets out a deadline by which
the Member States must implement its goals. Should a country fail to implement a Directive,
in principal, the directive could automatically become law in the country upon expiration of
the deadline. HIGHAM & GORDON, supra note 16, § 1.55.
26. Communication by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
the status and implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the markets for
telecommunications services, 1995 O.J. (C 275) 2.
27. Commission Directive 90/387 on establishment of open network provisions, 1990
O.J. (L 192) 10.
28. See Commission Directive 90/388, art. 2. While article 2 has subsequently been
completely rewritten, the basic purpose and general effect remains. See Commission
Directive 96/19 of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388 with regard to the
implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, 1996 O.J. (L 74) at
21-22.
29. Commission Directive 96/19 of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388 with
regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, 1996 O.J.
(L 74) at 21. This directive added new article 2(2). States with less developed networks
(defined as Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal) are allowed up to five additional years to
comply. Small states (Luxembourg) may be allowed up to two additional years to comply.
Communication by the Commission, 1995 O.J. (C 275) 2 n.6.
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company.3" The goal was that all new entrants could compete on an equal
basis with existing telecommunications networks, since the high capital
investment requirements of laying a telecommunications network would
otherwise block out new entrants. The Commission intended to limit both
technical and other impediments, such as stalling, to competitor access.
Access restrictions to existing networks would only be allowed for
public necessity purposes, so-called "essential requirements." Only "security
of network operations, maintenance of network integrity, and, in justified
cases, interoperability of services and data protection,"'" qualify as such.
With regard to conditions for access, the Directive spelled out three
principles that all ONP access conditions must satisfy in order to be valid:
"they must be based on objective criteria, they must be transparent and
published in an appropriate manner, [and] they must guarantee equality of
access and must be non-discriminatory, in accordance with Community
law." 3
2
The EU was expected to pass the final version of its ONP directive in
late 1996. However, the EU Telecommunications Ministers did not reach
a common position on a proposed Directive until March 6, 1997. 33
b. The Development of German Telecommunications Law
Article 87 . of the German Constitution [Grundgesetz] had previously
clearly delineated the providing of postal service, including mail, telecom-
munications, and banking functions, as a responsibility of the federal
government.34 However, as of 1994, the Constitution was amended; now
the federal government remains responsible for ensuring that adequate
telecommunications services are available in Germany, but it is no longer
responsible for actually providing those services.
Before 1989, German telecommunications law was founded primarily
upon two laws: the Law on Telecommunications Equipment [Gesetz fiber
Fernmeldeanlagen] which authorized the establishment and operation of the
telecommunications network through the DBP, and the Telegraph Route
30. HIGHAM & GORDON, supra note 16, § 3.35.
31. Commission Directive 90/388, art. 2, cl. 6.
32. Commission Directive 90/388, art. 3, cl. 1.
33. 1997th Council Meeting-Telecommunications-Brussels, RAPID, Mar. 6, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, RAPID File. The proposed directive will replace EP
and Council Directive 95/62/EC. The draft text is available on the EU's web site at
<http://europa.eu.intlen/comm/opoce/395/r3513.html>.
34. GG art. 87 1.1 (F.R.G.).
35. Klaus W. Riehmer, Organisation und Regulierung der Telekommunikation in
Deutschland [Organization and Regulation of Telecommunications in Germany], in
KOMMUNIKATION OI-NE MONOPOLE II, supra note 5, at 369, 374.
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Law [Telegraphenwege-Gesetz] which granted the DBP rights-of-way to
establish and operate its system.36
As in the United States, liberalization first came in the area of
equipment manufacturing and sales. In 1989, DBP lost its monopoly in this
area. 7 Reform of the telecommunications laws has proceeded in primarily
three phases: Post Reform I in 1989, Post Reform II in 1994, and finally,
the TKG in 1996. While the impetus for reform existed independently
within Germany as well, how reform has been effected to a degree has been
dictated by the requirements of the EC Directives discussed above.
i. Post Reform I (1989)
Post Reform I in 1989 laid the legal groundwork for the creation of
a private market for telecommunications goods and services.38 The drafters
intended that the legal framework in the industry would be reversed, that
monopoly would become the exception and competition the rule.3' The
law effected several foundational changes in the structure of telecommunica-
tions in Germany. First, some areas of telecommunications services like
mobile service and manufacture and sale of equipment were actually opened
to private competition. Second, it split the DBP into three sections: the mail
service, the post bank, and telecommunications (Deutsche Telekom),
creating respective independent organizations.4 ° Third, it effected a vertical
split between the actual provision of telecommunications services and
oversight over the industry, leaving the former to Deutsche Telekom and
creating a separate regulatory body, the Federal Ministry for Post and
Telecommunications [Bundesministeriumfiir Post und Telekommunikation,
or BMPT] to perform the latter.4 Finally, it changed the legal relationship
between Deutsche Telekom and consumers from the realm of public to
private law.'
Post Reform I created a dual legal framework, providing rules for
36. ErDENMOLLER, supra note 5, at S.
37. Id. at 29.
38. Gesetz zur Neustrukturierung des Post- und Fernmeldewesens und der Deutschen
Bundespost [Law on Restructuring the Postal and Telecommunications Services and the
Federal Postal System] (PostStruktG), v. 8.6.1989 (BGBl. I S.1026) (F.R.G.).
39. BRIGrrrE HAAR, MARKTOFFNUNG IN DER TELEKOMMUNIKATION [OPENING MARKETs
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS] 290 (1995) (citing Bundesministerffir das Post und Fernmelde-
wesen: Reform des Post und Fernmeldewesens [Federal Minister for the Postal Service and
Telecommunications: Reforming the Postal Service and Telecommunications] p. 4).
40. Id. at 287.
41. Riehmer, supra note 35, at 370.
42. PostStruktG § 65 (III); Postverfassungsgesetz (PostVerfG), § 9 I 1, v. 8.6.1989
(BGBI. I S.1026); Gesetz iiber Femmeldeanlagen (FAG) [Law on Telecommunications
Equipment] § 8 v. 3.7.1989 (BGBI. I S.1455); Riehmer, supra note 35, at 369, 381.
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those telecommunications functions remaining in the monopoly realm and
those which became competitive. The provision of telephone service and
network functions remained exclusively the domain of Deutsche Tele-
kom. 43 Other telecommunications functions, like mobile telephones,
corporate networks, manufacturing and sales of telephones, and satellite
communications were opened to competition. Because Deutsche Telekom
was required to operate in monopoly areas yet could also operate in
competitive areas, it was critical that the profits from each area be kept
separate. Otherwise, Deutsche Telekom could use profits from its monopoly
activities to subsidize its competitive activities, thereby giving it an unfair
advantage over its competitors.' In order to prevent such subsidization,
the law required that Deutsche Telekom 's various enterprises and their
earnings be kept separate.45
ii. Post Reform II (1994)
The basic purpose of Post Reform I146 was to make the three
fledgling former DBP entities ready for competition.47 The first concrete
step was to turn all three into private corporations; Deutsche Telekom
became Deutsche Telekom AG (Telekom).48 Moreover, it amended the
German Federal Constitution in order to allow private entities like the newly
private Telekom to provide telecommunications services. 49
Post Reform II also established a federal institution to supervise the
privatization of Telekom. This institution, the Federal Institution for Post
and Telecommunications [Bundesanstaltfiir Post und Telekommunikation],
also has continued supervisory powers to ensure that the privatized
43. See HAAR, supra note 39, at 290.
44. See id. at 305.
45. Id. at 306; PostVerfG § 37, sentence 1.
46. Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Postwesens und der Telekommunikation: Postneuor-
dungsgesetz [Law on Restructuring the Postal Services and Telecommunications]
(PTNeuOG), 27.6.1994 (BGBI. I S.2325).
47. HAAR, supra note 39, at 314. A former high official of the Bundespost is quoted as
saying, "'You must be a lunatic to think that the German communications industry could
successfully compete with American industry internationally."' Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker,
Competing Goals of National Telecommunications Policies, in THE LAW AND EcONOMIcS
OF TRANSBORDER TELECOMMUNICATIONS, at 13, 23 (Mestmdcker ed., 1987).
48. Art. 3 PTNeuOG, Gesetz zur Umwandlung der Unternehmen der Deutschen
Bundespost in die Rechtsform der Aktiengesellschaft [Law on Converting the Businesses of
the German Federal Postal System to Joint Stock Companies] (Postumwandlungsgesetz:
PostUmwG). See HAAR, supra note 39, at 287.
49. Post Reform II amended article 87(f) sentence 1 of the German constitution. Now,
rather than both guaranteeing and providing adequate service that is broadly available
(fldichendekend angemessene und ausreichende Dienstleistungen), the federal government is
merely required to guarantee that such are available. HAAR, supra note 39, at 314.
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corporation functions properly."
However, Post Reform II did not end Telekom ' monopoly over basic
telephone service. Accordingly, the law has been referred to as "Privatiza-
tion without Liberalization."5'
iii. Telekommunikationsgesetz (1996) (Post Reform III)
The TKG, in compliance with the European Council's timetable, sets
forth January 1, 1998 as the date for the complete opening of the telecom-
munications network and services market in Germany for private competi-
tion.52 Passage in summer of 1996 was aimed at allowing the first licenses
to be granted in early 1997. 53
2. The United States
The United States telecommunications industry grew from a patchwork
of independent operators dominated by the early Bell System, into a de
facto monopoly as the Bell System squeezed out and/or acquired its
competitors in the early twentieth century, and finally into a regulated, state-
sanctioned monopoly.54 Until the 1970s, AT&T, through the ubiquitous
Bell System, served as consumers' one-stop shopping provider, providing
all equipment, repairs, local exchange, and long-distance services. Some
specialized long-distance competition was introduced in the 1960s and
equipment sales and manufacturing were opened to competition in 1976, but
the major change in the industry occurred in 1982 with the court-ordered
break-up of AT&T. This opened the long-distance market to competition
and split off the local exchange carriers from long-distance service. The
1996 Act completes the process, opening local service to competition.
a. Structure of the U.S. Telecommunications Network
A telephone service customer's phone is connected to the Local
50. Gesetz 1iber das Postwesen (BAPostG) § 1 v. 3.7.1989 (BGBI. I S.1449).
51. Axel Kammholz, Bundeskartelamt, Das Bundeskartelamt als Regulierer? [The
Federal Cartel Office as Regulator?], in VORTRAG Im RAHMEN DER EUROFORUM-
KONFERENZ: TELECOMMARKT DEUTSCHLAND VOR DER LIZENZVERGABE [SPEECH AT THE
EUROFORUM CONFERENCE: THE GERMAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET BEFORE THE
AWARDING OF LICENSES] [hereinafter SPEECH AT EUROFORUM CONFERENCE] § 12, p. 18
(Feb. 26-28, 1996, Cologne, Germany).
52. The law will supersede the four earlier laws governing telecommunications in
Germany, PTRegG, FAG, PTRegG, and TWO, which all expire on December 31, 1997, in
accordance with the provisions of Post Reform II. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, at
33.
53. Hiltl & Grolmann, supra note 7, at 169.
54. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 1.16.
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Exchange Carrier (LEC),55 usually a Bell Operating Company (BOC),
which provides local telephone service and connects the customer's long-
distance calls with his or her designated interexchange carrier (IXC), a long-
distance provider.56 The telephone call travels from the customer to the
LEC's local central office and then to the IXC 7 BOC and independent
company territories are divided by the Modification of Final Judgment
(MIFJ) into Local Access and Transport Areas (LATA), each of which
encompasses many LECs. The LATAs constitute boundaries; as a general
rule, BOCs may not provide interLATA service, only intraLATA service.
58
b. Purposes of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
As stated in the introduction to the Conference Report, the 1996 Act
is intended "to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of
advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to
all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competi-
tion."59 Specifically, with regard to telecommunications markets, the
centerpiece of the 1996 Act is its opening local exchange service to
competition. The Act allows long-distance companies to enter this market
and allows local telephone exchange providers to enter the long-distance
market under specified conditions. Moreover, the Act provides rules for
providing universal service, removing barriers to entry of new competitors,
and interconnection.
C. Regulators
Regulation of the telecommunications industry has taken different
forms in the two countries because of the industries' differing structures.
Until recently in Germany, the service provider was also the regulator--the
DBP performed both functions. By contrast, in the United States, though
AT&T was a state-approved monopoly, it remained a private organization,
regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the courts,
and state regulators.
55. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(26) (West Supp. 1996).
56. Alternative "bypass" systems exist, however, usually for businesses, like point-to-
point microwave, DTS, etc. STEPHEN R. BARNETT ET AL., LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 29-30 (1988). Eli M. Noam, Private Local
Networks: The Next Frontier of Competition in U.S. Telecommunications, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF TRANSBORDER TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 47, at 207.
57. CHARLES H. KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 3
(1994).
58. Id. at 55.
59. S. REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996).
[Vol. 49
Number 3] TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN GERMANYAND U.S. 565
With the changes brought about over the past several years, the
German system is becoming more like the U.S. system: the providers
themselves are, or are to become, private, but subject to oversight by federal
regulators. However, German telecommunications providers are also subject
to the authority of EC regulation.
1. German Telecommunications Regulators
a. National Regulation
Prior to 1989, the service provider and the regulator were one and the
same--the DBP performed both functions. It was a federal organization
subject only to relatively loose federal control60 and headed by the federal
cabinet level Minister of the Postal Service and Telecommunications.6" It
was, on one hand, subject to the market in terms of generating revenue but
on the other an administration subject to political and governmental
bureaucratic control.62
Post Reform I in 1989 effected a split between entrepreneurial and
regulator functions, though the boundaries between the two areas remained
murky because the exact line between sovereign oversight activities and
private entrepreneurial functions remained unclear.63 However, with Post
Reform H's changing DBP's telecommunications arm into a private
corporation, Telekom, on January 1, 1995, the public-private split between
it and the BMPT became clear.' One substantial practical effect of this
split was to free Telekom to contest BMPT decisions in court. Previously
Telekom had no standing to sue the BMPT because it was not a freestanding
legal entity.6
5
The BMPT is a member of the federal govemment 6 and carries
primary responsibility for ensuring that Telekom is run according to law.67
Accordingly, it answers to the Federal Chancellor and has authority over
ensuring application of and compliance with all telecommunications and
60. Alfred Haid & Jfirgen Mler, Telecommunications in the Federal Republic of
Germany, in EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS ORGANIZATIONS § 6.1.2.1 (James Foreman-
Peck & Jargen Mtller eds., 1988).
61. GONTHER PFEIFFER & BERNHARD WIELAND, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN GERMANY
§ 2.1.1 (1990).
62. Haid & Miller, supra note 60, § 6.1.2.1.
63. Riehmer, supra note 35, at 371.
64. There will remain some overlap in that the BMPT will continue to approve Telekom
rates for the foreseeable future. Id. at 372.
65. Id. at 375.
66. Postverfassungsgesetz (PostVerfG) § 25, v. 8.6.1989 (BGB1. I S.1026).
67. ELLGER & KLUTH, supra note 8, at 61.
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other laws.6" It includes a regulatory council made up of representatives
from each of the states6 9 which participates in decision making.7° Some
of the BMPT's decision making is carried out by decision making panels.7
The Federal Cartel Office (Cartel Office) also has authority over
telecommunications companies under section 44 of the Law Against
Restraints of Competition (Competition Law).72 The Cartel Office applies
both domestic and EU competition law to ensure proper competition within
the market. Its control over the telephone company as a natural monopoly
is weaker than it will be in the future when the industry is opened to
competition.73
b. The TKG
The TKG designates as the National Regulatory Agency (NRA)74 the
Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Posts [Regulierungsbe-
h6rde fir Telekommunikation und Post] which operates within the
jurisdictional area of the Ministry of Economics. 75 It will replace the
BMPT, which will be dissolved.76 While it is intended that the NRA be
politically independent from the Federal Government, debate continues in
Bonn over whether the NRA's oversight will be politically or substantively
based.77
The NRA's seat is in Bonn and is presided over by a president who
represents the NRA both in and out of court, and who regulates the NRA's
actions via rules of procedure that must be ratified by the Federal Ministry
for Economics. 7 The President and two Vice-Presidents are appointed by
the Federal Government based on the suggestion of the Advisory Council.
68. Id. at 62.
69. Gesetz fiber die Regulierung der Telekommunikation und des Postwesens [Law on
Regulating the Postal Services and Telecommunications] (PTRegG) § 11, sentence 1, v.
14.9.1994 (BGBl. I S.2325).
70. Id. § 13, sentence (1).
71. Id. § 15, sentence (1).
72. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen [Law on Restraints Against Competition]
(GWB) v. 24.9.1980 (BGBI. I S.1761) [hereinafter Competition Law]; see also ELLGER &
KLUTH, supra note 8, at 283.
73. Kammholz, supra note 51, at 4.
74. NRA is the term used in EC Directives referring to state telecommunications
regulators.
75. Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) § 66, v. 1.8.1996 (BGBI. I S.1120).
76. Stellungnahme des Bundesrats: Entwurf eines Telekommunikationsgesetzes,
Bundesrat, Drucksache 80/96 (Beschluss) [Opinion of the Bundesrat: Draft of a Telecommu-
nications Law, Circular 80/96 (resolution)] (22.03.96) § 72 [hereinafter Bundesrat Opinion].
77. Jochen Schuster, Die Wut der Jungen Wilden [The Rage of the Young Wild Ones],
DIE WOCHE, Nov. 1, 1996, at 16.
78. TKG § 66(2).
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While earlier drafts of the TKG set five-year terms of office and allowed for
their removal from office by the Federal Government, the TKG is silent on
these matters.79
In accordance with the suggestion of the Bundesrat, the upper house
of the German Parliament, the TKG establishes a regulatory structure that
includes an Advisory Council [Beirat] made up of nine members each from
the Bundestag, the lower house of the German Parliament, and the
Bundesrat.80 Its duties include: nominating candidates for the positions of
President and Vice-President of the NRA; taking part in making decisions
concerning granting of licenses and making market dominance determina-
tions; proposing measures for the implementation of regulatory goals
generally and universal service in particular; providing advice and
information to the NRA; and taking part in preparing regular reports to the
Bundestag concerning the condition of the market and regulation.8'
The NRA is charged with preventing competition in monopoly areas
and encouraging it in competitive areas. As envisioned in EU Directives and
as recommended by commentators, the NRA is to be as independent as
possible in its decision making because its purpose is not merely to guard
against rule violations but also to foster a competitive environment."2 The
NRA is empowered to form commissions to assist with decision making or
to provide expert opinions.83
In order to properly fulfill its oversight and regulatory functions, the
NRA has the authority to demand relevant information and documentation
from market participants,84 to enter and inspect telecommunications service
providers' premises, and to seize relevant documentation. 5 The NRA must
provide its requests for information in writing, including the legal basis for
79. Commentators had expressed concern with the original rules with regard to political
control over the President and Vice-Presidents. The NRA is theoretically intended to be
relatively independent of political forces, but some political control remains. See, e.g.,
Kammholz, supra note 51, at 20.
80. TKG § 67(1). In its opinion, the Bundesrat had recommended the addition of an
oversight council made up of representatives of each of the states. Because the states also
carry political responsibility for satisfaction of constitutional norms, including the existence
of telecommunications services, the Bundesrat considered it appropriate that the states have
some say in how the NRA fulfills its duties. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 73.
The Bundesrat is made up of representatives of each state. GG art. 51 (F.R.G.).
81. TKG § 69.
82. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 67.
83. TKG § 70.
84. Id. § 69(1). The law refers to "enterprises and groups of enterprises" [Unternehmen
und Vereinigungen von Unternehmen] as subject to reporting requirements. The Competition
Law is to define these terms. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 69.
85. TKG § 69(4). Firms may seek reimbursement for all costs where an inspection is
illegal. Id. § 69(9).
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the request. It may only conduct searches after obtaining a court order from
a local district court, absent extenuating circumstances. 6 Information
demanded under this section may not be used for other purposes--such as
tax or securities investigations--unless a significant public interest is
involved or false information was intentionally provided to the NRA.87
The NRA may prohibit specific activities of license-holders where they
are not adhering properly to their license terms and may issue administrative
fines of up to DM 1,000,000.88 Violations such as improper compliance
with reporting requirements are subject to fines of up to DM 20,000.
Violations such as providing telecommunications services without a license
and raising rates without approval are subject to fines of up to DM
1,000,000.89 The drafters of the Original Draft recommended the use of
administrative fines over the other available remedies-prohibitions
[Untersagung], bans [Verbot], and closing of an enterprise [Ausserbetrieb-
nahme]-because their effect on consumers is too negative.90
The NRA is to make some of its decisions through three-person
adjudicatory panels referred to as "Ruling Chambers." 91 These Chambers
have jurisdiction over questions involving the distribution of licenses when
applications exceed the number readily available, imposition of universal
service, rates regulation, open network provision and interconnection, and
assignment of frequencies where several applications are filed for the same
frequency.92 The Chambers consist of three members, all of whom must
be life-time government employees with appropriate backgrounds in
telecommunications. The Chambers are judicial bodies that also have
authority to function as arbitrators between private parties.
Proceedings are instituted before a Chamber either ex officio or upon
a motion. Participants in hearings are the petitioner, the provider of services
against whom a claim is brought, and any other party that the Chamber
86. Id. § 69(5).
87. Id. § 69(8).
88. Id. § 68. The potentially high fines are based on the expectancy that turnover rates
will be high in the industry. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 93.
89. TKG § 96(2).
90. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 68.
91. TKG § 73(1). There is some concern that the decision-making of such bodies,
particularly where they make decisions implicating competition law questions, could result
in contradictory and perhaps improper decisions. Kammholz, supra note 51, at 22.
The Bundesrat sought to limit the authority of these Chambers to multi-party disputes.
Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 75.
92. TKG § 73(1). The final version of the TKG represents a reduction in the scope of
the Chambers' authority: the prior version had delegated all decisionmaking apart from
communications secrecy, data security and safeguards, to the Chambers. January Draft, supra
note 3, § 70(1).
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believes is significantly interested in the outcome. 3
Participating parties have the right to comment on the content of the
proceeding. With approval from the Chamber, other parties who could be
economically affected by the process may also offer comments. Normally,
decisions are made based upon oral proceedings, but where the parties agree
a decision may be made based upon written comments. Hearings are public
unless the parties request closure to the public because public safety or
private trade secrets would be threatened.94
A Chamber can order investigations and may collect evidence
necessary to fulfill its functions. Civil process rules apply for evidence
collection. Appeals regarding evidence collection are to be brought in the
Higher Regional Court.95 A Chamber may seize such items as are
necessary as evidence in a proceeding.9 6
Chamber decisions must be legally justified and within the realm of
its authority.97 A Chamber may conduct investigation and gather necessary
evidence9" as well as issue temporary orders pending a final decision.99
A Chamber communicates its decisions to the parties via their registered
agents. Where a party appeals a Chamber decision or otherwise takes legal
action against the NRA, there is no postponement of the effect of the
decision or action pending the outcome of the appeal.' °°
While the NRA is relatively independent, it remains subject to
parliamentary oversight. In order that the parliament may evaluate whether
competition is functioning properly, the NRA is required to report to the
federal government every two years regarding its activities and the condition
of the telecommunications market.'0 ' Along with this report it must also
present the Monopoly Commission's regular reports analyzing the
competitiveness of the market. The report must also address whether the
definition of universal service should be changed.0"
Because of the overlapping jurisdictions of the NRA and the Cartel
Office, the TKG mandates a degree of cooperation between the two in order
93. TKG § 75(2).
94. Id. § 75(3).
95. Id. § 76(2).
96. Id. § 77(1).
97. Id. § 79(1).
98. Id. § 76(1).
99. Id. § 78.
100. The NRA has a strong interest in the immediate enforceability of its decisions. This
is particularly true in conflicts between competitors where, given heavy capital investments,
delay could financially harm a party. Id. § 80(2). TKG Legislative Repot supra note 3,
§ 77.
101. TKG § 81(1).
102. Id. § 81.
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to prevent contradictory decisions from the two bodies. 3 For example,
where the number of licenses in a given market is limited, the NRA "shall"
work together with the Cartel Office in making its decisions concerning
granting licenses."° Where the NRA makes decisions concerning rate
regulation and open network provision and interconnection, or where it
attaches collateral clauses to licenses affecting these matters, the NRA must
give the Federal Cartel Office an opportunity to comment.' Similarly,
where the Cartel Office is implementing procedures regarding market
dominant enterprises in the telecommunications sector, it must give the
NRA opportunity to comment prior to issuing decisions. Both agencies are
directed to seek consistent interpretations of the TKG in order to avoid
conflict with the Competition Law and to keep each other informed of
observations and determinations which may be significant to the other."6
c. EC Regulation
Both the European Council and the European Commission have
authority to regulate state telecommunications markets. 7 The Commis-
sion has authority under article 90 to enact legislation aimed at eliminating
state-sponsored monopolies in telecommunications, to enact other legislation
as specifically empowered by the Council, and to prevent anticompetitive
behavior on an individual basis by enforcing articles 85 and 86. On the one
hand, the Community has authority over the individual states through its
requirements that they establish and maintain free markets in goods and
services; on the other hand, it has authority over individual private
enterprises through enforcement of competition laws. 8
The European Council has authority to enact legislation concerning
anticompetitive behavior under articles 85 and 86 and under article 100a,
which empowers it to adopt measures for the "establishing and functioning
103. The Cartel Office would be responsible for resolving matters concerning market
dominant positions and Competition Law matters generally, while the state cartel offices
would remain responsible for local and regional cartel law questions. Id. § 82. The
Bundesrat found the overlapping jurisdiction between the NRA and Cartel Office to be
wasteful and pointless. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 2. It sought to eliminate this
problem by taking all market dominance questions out of the hands of the NRA and putting
them in the hands of the appropriate federal or state cartel authorities.
104. TKG § 82.
105. Id. § 82.
106. Id. § 82.
107. For more thorough treatment of EC powers in this area, see, for example, HIGHAM
& GORDON, supra note 16, § 1.1; JOACHIM SCHERER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAWS IN
EUROPE 1-5 (1993).
108. ELLGER & KLUTH, supra note 8, at 283.
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of the internal market."'' 9 Within this rubric comes prohibiting cartels and
restraining market dominant behavior."0 Under this authority, the Council
adopts measures the individual state legislative bodies are to enact so as to
become binding in the particular state. The Commission has authority to
enforce EU competition laws against individual private enterprises. In
particular, it is empowered to review mergers that have European Union-
wide dimensions, primarily defined as satisfying a high turnover thresh-
old."'
2. U.S. Regulators
a. Federal and State Regulation
Telecommunications law in the United States is primarily comprised
of the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act), the antitrust laws, state
regulatory laws, FCC orders and regulations, the actions of the public
utilities commissions of the states," 2 and now, the 1996 Act which
amends the 1934 Act. Not surprisingly, this myriad of authority has often
led to conflicts between the various bodies of law. In general, the FCC has
primary jurisdiction when conflicts arise between regulatory and antitrust
standards,"' and when federal regulation preempts state regulation."
4
The lines between state and federal regulatory authority and their primacy
are at times uncertain. The National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners provides some degree of coordination between the federal
and state regulatory organizations.
The 1934 Act established a dual regulatory structure: The FCC has
jurisdiction over interstate and foreign wire and radio communications, and
the states have jurisdiction over intrastate communications." 6 Where a
telephone plant is used for both intrastate and interstate service, both the
FCC and state regulators have concurrent jurisdiction."7 Because this
109. EEC TREATY art. 100a(1).
110. BusiNEss TRANsACfnoNS IN GERMANY § 2.06[3] (Dennis Campbell ed., 1995).
111. Id.
112. KENNEDY, supra note 57, at xv.
113. United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1349-50 (D.D.C. 1974) (citation and
emphasis omitted).
114. See, e.g., KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 2.7 (discussing difficulties of dividing
federal versus state jurisdiction based on the 1934 Act).
115. Richard E. Nohe, A Different Time, a Different Place: Breaking up Telephone
Companies in the United States and Japan, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 307, 313 (1996).
116. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 152(a)-(b) (1995)).
117. Walter Sapronov, A Primer on Telecommunications Law and Regulation, in
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAw 1, 5 (Sapranov ed., 1988).
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distinction is often artificial, in practice, the line between intrastate on the
one hand, and interstate or foreign communications on the other are
extremely blurry. Accordingly, often the various components of a service
are either divided between the two realms--and thereby the two regula-
tors--r the FCC simply preempts the state regulator."l 8
The FCC is an independent agency, comprised of five commissioners
appointed by the President. No more than three may be members of the
same political party. The commissioners serve for five-year terms and may
only be dismissed for cause. The FCC holds a mixture of legislative powers
(through its authority to adopt regulations), executive authority (through its
power to enforce its rules), and judicial power (exercised via adjudication
of cases)."9
From virtually the beginning of the industry, antitrust law decisions
have played an enormous role in shaping the industry's structure. 2 ° The
primary example, and the suit which is most responsible for the current
shape of the industry, is United States v. AT&T.'2' Filed in 1974 and
presided over by Federal District Court Judge Harold Greene, the suit ended
in 1982 with a consent decree known as the Modification of Final Judgment
(MFJ). y  The suit originally concerned an alleged unlawful combination
between the various Bell entities that resulted in their monopolization of
both long-distance service and telecommunications equipment manufactur-
ing. 2 3 However, the suit took many twists and turns, based upon chang-
ing priorities within the Justice Department, legislative proposals, and
industry activity.
The MFJ had four primary components. First, it broke up the Bell
system into various parts, forcing AT&T to divest itself of its twenty-two
LECs. The LECs, also referred to as Bell Operating Companies (BOC),
were then distributed among seven Regional Bell Holding Companies
(RBOC). 24 The BOCs, in turn, were subdivided into 163 Local Access
and Transport Areas (LATA), which served as the boundaries for the
118. See KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 43.
119. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1995). For further discussion of the FCC's authority and activities,
see BARNETT ET AL., supra note 56, at 19.
120. See, e.g., KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, §§ 1.1-1.7 (describing development of the
industry).
121. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983).
122. The 1996 Act refers to the MFJ as the "AT&T Consent Decree." H.R. CoNF. REP.
104-458, at 198.
123. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 4.4.
124. KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 50-51. See id. at 52-54, for a practical explanation of
the specific decree restrictions that apply to BOC operations.
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definition of local service. Second, it required the BOCs to provide
interconnection to all long-distance carriers and information services
providers in a nondiscriminatory manner. Third, it barred the BOCs from
various lines of business, including providing long-distance and information
services and manufacturing of equipment. Fourth, the MFJ liberated AT&T
from a 1956 consent decree's restrictions. 2 5
On the state level, telecommunications enterprises are typically
regulated through state public service commissions. Their activities typically
resemble FCC regulation, but wide variety exists between each of the fifty
states. Both states and municipalities often exercise further authority over
telecommunications providers by way of right-of-way regulation, building
codes, and other local regulation. 12
6
b. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Regulators
The 1996 Act does not make significant alterations to the existing
regulatory structure, other than in explicitly repealing the FCC's authority
to grant exemptions from antitrust oversight of mergers within the industry.
This is discussed in greater detail below in Section IT.C.2.b.
3. Comparison and Conclusions
As a general matter, telecommunications in both countries are subject
to the primary jurisdiction of the federal governments. Potential conflicts
with state regulators remain in both systems. In the United States, the
separation between interstate and intrastate authority is somewhat artificial
and leads to bluriness between the two jurisdictions. The German system
under the TKG should avoid this problem by retaining substantial federal
control over the industry.
Another area of potential tension exists between different federal
regulators. Professors Wernhard M6schel and Ernst-Joachim Mestmdcker
have expressed concern regarding potential conflict between Cartel Office
and NRA decision making given the risk of inconsistent decisions,
particularly in the area of competition law, since both have jurisdiction over
the industry.27 Both professors and Telekom have argued that leaving
competition law matters to the Cartel Office, rather than creating a whole
new agency, would have been a better solution.128 The President of the
125. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 4.6 (citations omitted).
126. SAPRONOV, supra note 117, at 21.
127. Telekom befiirchtet Uberregulierung auf dem Weg in den Wettbewerb [Telecom
Fears Overregulation on the Road to Competition], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG,
Mar. 13, 1996, at 19.
128. Id.
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Cartel Office is concerned that a special competition law could develop in
the area of telecommunications and that this could constitute a disadvantage
to the economy as a whole.129 If this develops as a substantial issue in the
future, Germany could remedy the problem by taking an approach like the
1996 Act, which explicitly takes antitrust control out of the hands of the
FCC and places it with the antitrust division of the Department of Justice.
Ill. THE PRIMARY Focus AREAS OF THE
TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSGESETZ AND U.S. LAW
Broadly speaking, the goal of the TKG is to open the telecommunica-
tions market in Germany to competition and to position Telekom to be able
to succeed in the approaching competitive market. To this end, it sets forth
the basic structures of a competition-based market and delineates the terms
under which Telekom competes.
The TKG sets forth as its purpose the establishment of regulation that
both promotes competition in the telecommunications industry and
guarantees broad availability of appropriate and sufficient telecommunica-
tions services.13° The regulatory goals are to protect consumer interests,
establish a competitive market, ensure universal service, ensure proper use
of frequency spectrum, and protect the public interest."'
The TKG contains five subject areas of primary importance for voice
telecommunications services: licenses [Lizensen], universal service
[Universaldienst], regulation of market dominant providers [Regulierung
marktbeherrschender Anbieter],"' access to public networks and intercon-
nection [Offener Netzzugang und Zusammenschaltung], and use of rights-of-
way [Benutzung der Verkehrswege].
By contrast, the primary focus of 1996 Act is to open local service to
competition. It is expected that cable television companies will be among
the first of the major competitors in local markets since most homes are
already wired for cable television. Thus, the law aims to facilitate such
competition, placing much emphasis upon cable television enterprise entry
into telecommunications markets.
129. Id.
130. Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) § 1, v. 1.8.1996 (BGBI.I S. 1120).
131. Id. § 2(2).
132. Part III of the Original Draft was entitled Regulation of Market Dominant Providers,
although individual rules concerning market dominance were also scattered throughout. With
the June Draft this section was retitled as "Regulation of Remuneration" [Entgeltregulie-
rung]. See June Draft § 22, supra note 3.
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A. Licensing
A licensing system is necessary to ensure that various state goals and
requirements are established and maintained in a telecommunications
system, including ensuring universal service, preventing abuse of a market
dominant position, and ensuring interconnection.
1. Germany
a. The Law Leading to the TKG
While private enterprises could obtain licenses for some private, closed
telecommunications networks (such as in banking and airline reservations),
essentially there was no free market in telecommunications services in
Germany, so licensing was not an issue as far as monopoly-provided basic
local or long-distance service was concerned.133 However, since 1989, the
BMPT has approved licenses in competitive markets such as providing
mobile telephone service and the sale of satellite transmission devices.
34
b. The TKG
The goal of the TKG is to establish a successful competitive
environment in Germany in the telecommunications industry. Because the
TKG imposes no domestic ownership requirement for entry into the
telecommunications market, 35 this competition will be fully international.
The competition goal is based in the belief that a monopoly telecommunica-
tions service provider is inadequate to keep up with and properly exploit the
myriad of technological advances in telecommunications related fields. This
goal is also based on the requirement of the European Commission that
speech telephony and other telecommunications services be open to
competition by January 1, 1998 in Member States. 36 Because Telekom
will remain the sole provider of telecommunications services until January
1, 1998, the government is establishing a regulatory structure to give new
entrants an opportunity to compete against the monopoly at that time.
In the wake of the termination of Telekom " monopoly over telecom-
munications, the TKG drafters believed that market forces alone would be
133. PFEEFFER & WIELAND, supra note 61, at 22-23.
134. Riehmer, supra note 35, at 385.
135. See Hilti & GroBmann, supra note 7, at 172. See also, Germany to U.S.: Join the
Telecom Party in 1998, TELECOMM. NEWS, Apr. 10, 1995 (on file with author) (reporting
German Federal Minister of Posts and Telecommunications Wolfgang Boetsch's challenge
to the U.S. to open its telecommunications markets to foreign companies to the same degree
that Germany is opening its markets).
136. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, at 33.
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insufficient to guarantee the establishment of telecommunications service
provision that would be in the interests of consumers and of all market
participants.'37 According to the Federal Government, a licensing scheme
is necessary because many requirements for market participants, such as
provision of universal service elements, must be set forth on an individual
basis. 3 A licensing system will enable the NRA to identify individually
the specific duties each market participant must fulfill. Basic requirements
or duties include ensuring network security, establishing disaster and crisis
provisions and precautions, ensuring data security, protecting long-distance
secrecy, and blanket basic telecommunications service coverage. 39
The TKG specifically directs that the overall goals of the law be
observed in the granting of licenses. 40 Among these goals are ensuring
"equal-opportunity and workable competition" in both rural and urban areas
and the availability of affordable universal service.' 4' Licenses may be
individually tailored to ensure achieving those goals. Toward this end,
licenses may be amended even after their granting. 42
The TKG mandates the securing of a license for the offering of voice
and data transmission services over one's own telecommunications net and
for the operation of transmission paths that cross real property and are used
for providing telecommunications services for the general public. 43
Operating transmission lines used by third parties is presumed to constitute
the provision of telecommunications services for the general public."4
However, licenses are not required where one merely resells services over
another's network. 45
Licenses are available in four classes: mobile radio telecommunications
(Class 1), satellite radio communications service (Class 2), other telecom-
munications services that do not fall into Classes 1 or 2 (Class 3), and wire
telephony service (Class 4).146 All license holders for speech telecommu-
nications are required to provide access to cost-free emergency services
137. Hiltl & GroBmann, supra note 7, at 170.
138. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, at 34.
139. Id.
140. Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) § 8(2), v. 1.8.1996 (BGBI. I S. 1120) (referring
to section 2(2)). This specific direction was added in the final version of the law. Compare
id. § 8(2) with June Draft, supra note 3, § 8(2).
141. TKG § 2(2).
142. Id. § 8(2).
143. Id. § 6(l).
144. Id. § 6(3).
145. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 6.
146. TKG § 6(2). It is assumed that the operation of a transmission path that is used by
third parties is a public telecommunications service. Id. § 6(3).
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calls.147
The NRA distributes licenses on the basis of written applications. 48
Licenses are normally granted where the application requirements are
satisfied and no reason for denial exists.1 49 Ideally, as many licenses will
be granted as there are applications to provide a given telecommunications
service. However, this may not always be possible. Because the number of
frequencies available is limited, and "to ensure effective, interference-free
use of frequencies," the NRA shall develop a frequency allocation table and
usage plan. 50 The frequency usage plan is to be drafted based upon the
table of frequency allocations,15 ' the overall aims of the TKG, and
"European harmonisation, technical developments and the compatibility of
frequency usages in the transmission media."'52 The plan is also to be
drafted with public participation.'53 Based upon this frequency-usage plan,
the NRA may limit the number of licenses for telecommunications markets
if frequencies are unavailable to satisfy all requests for licenses'
54
Where the number of licenses are so limited, the NRA, following a
hearing from concerned parties, may distribute licenses either by auction or
competitive bidding. 5 Auction is preferable to competitive bidding unless
auction is for some reason not suitable.5 6 In either case, the NRA may
exclude some companies from the process where it believes that their
participation will prejudice equal opportunity competition in that mar-
ket.'5 7 In considering such an exclusion, the NRA must consider com-
panies' legitimate interests in developing new technologies.
158
The intent of an auction is to identify the bidders able to make most
efficient use of the radio frequencies so distributed. 9 Prior to holding an
auction, the NRA must first identify:
147. Id. § 13(1).
148. Id. § 8(1).
149. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 8. The Bundesrat sought to provide that the
granting of Class 4 licenses (voice telephony) be made explicitly with broad-based coverage
in mind-in other words, to avoid cherry picking. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 16.
The TKG directs that licenses be granted with the explicit overall goal of providing
affordable universal service to both rural and urban customers. See supra note 140
(discussing section 8(2)).
150. TKG § 44(1).
151. Id. § 45.
152. Id. § 46(1).
153. Id. § 46(3).
154. Id. § 10.
155. Id. § 11(1).
156. Id. §§ 11(2), 11(5).
157. Id. § 11(3).
158. Id. § 11(3).
159. Id. § 11(4).
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1. the minimum requirements in terms of specialised skills and
qualifications bidders shall evidence in order to be admitted to
the auction,
2. the relevant product and geographical market for which the radio
frequencies bought at auction may be used in observance of the
frequency usage plan,
3. the license conditions, including the degree of coverage in respect
of frequency usage and the time required to achieve such degree,
as well as the frequency usage conditions of the future license
that must be observed, [and]
4. the basic number of radio frequencies which the bidder must buy
at auction for the startup of the telecommunications service,
provided such basic number is necessary.' 60
The auction may begin with an identified minimum bid.161
In cases where an auction is unsuitable, licenses shall be distributed
by a competitive bidding process.' 62 As are auctions, competitive bidding
is intended to establish the best provider. Prior to initiating the competitive
bidding process, the NRA must first identify:
1. the minimum requirements in terms of specialised qualifications
bidders shall evidence in order to be admitted to competitive
bidding,
2. the relevant product and geographical market for which the
licenses are to be granted,
3. the license conditions, including the degree of coverage in respect
of frequency usage and the time required to achieve such degree,
as well as the frequency usage conditions of the future license
that must be observed, [and]
4. the criteria according to which bidders' eligibility is assessed. 63
The criteria "shall be the specialised knowledge and efficiency of the
bidders, the suitability of plans to be submitted for the provision of the
telecommunication service subject to competitive bidding and the promotion
of workable competition in the relevant market."'164 Preference will be
shown for bidders that can ensure broad coverage of service. 65 Where
multiple bidders are equally suitable, licenses shall be granted by drawing
lots.
66
As a prerequisite to granting licenses, the NRA will also charge a
fee.' 67 Under section 16(1), the fee is to be set in agreement with the
160. Id. § 11(4).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 11(5).
163. Id. § 11(6).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. § 16(l).
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Ministries of the Interior, Finance, Justice and Economics and in accordance
with the requirements of the Administrative Expenses Act. 68 The fee is
to be set at a level that represents a reasonable relationship between the
economic value of the license and the administrative costs involved.169
Where licenses are distributed by auction according to section 11(4), if the
price arrived at by auction is less than the license fee as set according to the
above requirements, then the auction amount may be raised to the fee level
arrived at under section 16(1)170
Although the NRA can supply auxiliary clauses to a license in order
to further satisfy the goals of the TKG in general-particularly where
market dominant providers are concerned-the contents of a license are
determined by the applicant.' However, any such additional clauses'
contents should be proportional to the regulatory goals involved. 72
Licenses with conditions may be withdrawn where the conditions are not
fulfilled and the auxiliary clauses are to be eliminated where changed
market circumstances make them no longer necessary.'73
The NRA may refuse to grant a license: if the NRA is unable to grant
a useable frequency to satisfy the applicant's desired service requirements;
if the NRA determines that the applicant has insufficient reliability,
efficiency, and specialized knowledge to utilize the license over the long
term; or where the applicant otherwise would pose a risk to public security
or stability.7 For example, speculation in licenses is to be discouraged.
Accordingly, the NRA may refuse to grant a license to a party where it sees
a risk that the party seeks to acquire a license for the purpose of resale
rather than long-term use.'75 The NRA must approve in writing any
license transfers, utilizing the same criteria as for granting a license in the
first place. 7 Licenses may be revoked entirely or in part where the
licensee fails to satisfy the license's specific requirements or the TKG's
general requirements. 77
168. TKG § 16(1).
169. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 15.
170. TKG § 15(2).
171. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 8(1).
172. Id. § 8(2).
173. TKG §§ 8(2), 15.
174. Id. § 8(3). The legal requirements referred to in connection with reliability include
the demands of European law, German telecommunications secrecy law, and data protection
law. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 8(3).
175. Hiltl & Grolmann, supra note 7, at 171.
176. TKG § 9(1) (referring to grounds for denial of license application in sections 8(3)
and 11(3)).
177. Id. § 15.
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2. The United States
a. The Law Leading to the Telecommunications Act of 1996
In the local exchange market, the market has been stable for decades,
with no new entrants because of the local service monopoly. Accordingly,
a licensing system for new entrants was not necessary. By contrast, for
long-distance, since the first opening of long-distance to competition in
1969,178 carriers have had to obtain licenses from the FCC in order to
construct lines or provide service. 79 Section 214 of the 1934 Act allows
the FCC to place conditions on licenses that it grants.
In granting licenses, the FCC is guided by the 1934 Act's requirement
that "[in] choosing among applicants, the Commission [is] to be guided by
the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity."" 80 Public interest is
defined as the interests of the public at large, not of competitors.181
Congress granted the FCC, therefore, wide discretion in approving license
applications. However, this is not unbridled: appeal is available. The U.S.
Supreme Court has described its responsibility in this area as being "to say
whether the Commission has been guided by proper considerations in
bringing the deposit of its experience, the disciplined feel of the expert, to
bear on applications for licenses in the public interest."' 2 Factors to be
considered in granting licenses for establishing new lines, for example,
include whether more or additional competition in the area is in the public
interest and how much added service is desirable or necessary. 3
State licensing procedures vary among the fifty states. A brief
discussion of California law will be used as an example of state licensing
regulation. The California State Constitution deems telephone companies to
be public utilities subject to state legislature control.' 84 As public utilities,
they are subject to regulation by the Public Utilities Commission. A
provider of telephone services must first obtain a franchise which is, "a
special privilege conferred upon a corporation or individual by a govern-
178. In Re MCI, Decision, 18 F.C.C. 2d 953, 16 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1037 (1969),
reh'g denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C. 2d 190, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 226 (1970).
179. The Commission must approve construction of new lines and will only do so where
it concludes they will serve the "public convenience and necessity." 47 U.S.C. § 214. See
KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 12.3.
180. FCC v. RCA Comm., Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953).
181. Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
182. RCA Comm., Inc., 346 U.S. at 91.
183. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 498 F.2d at 776. See also KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 12.4.
184. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 3.
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ment duly empowered legally to grant it."'8 5 The word franchise is usually
used when referring to matters of vital public interest like gas, electricity or
telephone services." 6 The grant of a federal franchise entitles a grantee
to exercise the franchise without interference by the state."8 7
b. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The 1996 Act does not change the basic licensing rules described
above except that section 214 rules are revoked for open video systems.
3. Comparisons and Conclusions
Both pre-existing U.S. law and the TKG take very flexible, open-ended
approaches to the granting of licenses. In distributing licenses, the FCC is
to consider "the public interest, convenience, and necessity" while the NRA
is to fulfill the overall purposes of the TKG, including safeguarding user
interests, and ensuring competition and the availability of affordable service.
As discussed below in section Im.B.3 in more detail, licensing issues
are closely linked to universal service issues. As discussed in that section,
the critical issue for the TKG is the scope of the licenses. Local govern-
ments are concerned that without sufficient attention to the size and scope
of areas covered by licenses, a two-tiered telecommunications system could
develop if firms are allowed to carve out the most profitable areas and to
neglect less profitable areas.188 Again, the United States avoids this
problem because of the pre-existing, MFJ-imposed LATA system that
already covers the Nation.
Another substantial issue for the new German system may be access
to the licenses themselves. Early analysis of proposed licensing regulations
criticizes them for setting high licensing costs that could serve to exclude
or disadvantage all but the most well-financed ventures, particularly those
with pre-existing networks.8 9
B. Universal Service
Generally speaking, "universal service" refers to the availability to all
or nearly all consumers basic telephone service at a reasonable price and
with reasonable service quality. This has been a goal of regulators in all
systems since telephone service began. The emphasis has been on
185. 59 CAL. JUR. 3D Telephones and Telegraphs § 3 (1980).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, at 1.
189. Gerbard Hennemann, Harden ftr Newcomer [Hurdles for Newcomers], SOD-
DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Dec. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, SDZ File.
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inexpensive local telephone service. There has been consistent policy in
many, if not all, nations of artificially inflating long-distance rates so as to
provide subsidies for local service in order to keep the latter's cost low.'
However, with increased deregulation and increased competition in the
long-distance market, market forces pushed toward lower long-distance
rates, since those cross-subsidies from long-distance to local service had
distorted the market. For example, in the United States large consumers of
telecommunications services, such as big corporations, had bypassed local
exchanges in order to avoid paying larger fees by connecting their internal
systems directly with long-distance providers. 9 '
1. Germany
a. The Law Leading to the TKG
The German Constitution requires universal service; until 1995 the
State was required to provide it, since 1995 it must merely guarantee that
it is provided. 92 All property owners may demand connection to the local
telecommunications network.' 93
The provision of universal service in basic telephony was a major
DBP policy goal following World War II. By the mid-1980s, saturation had
virtually been attained, so the focus shifted to broadening access to new
services such as video text, teletex, cable TV, electronic mail, and ISDN
services. 194 The Law Regulating Telecommunications and the Post
Office195 states that telecommunications industry regulation is intended to
establish and maintain broadly available, modem, and reasonably priced
telephone service that is equally available in rural and urban areas, that
users have discrimination free access to the system, and that there be
effective management of limited resources, attention to social concerns, and
guaranteed, effective consumer and data protection.'96 To this end,
Germany must also heed the demands of EU Directives in this area.
190. Germany explicitly wanted to exempt Deutsche Telekom from EC efforts to
eliminate national restrictions in telecommunication services because of the desire that the
phone system be able to use its long-distance revenues to expand the national network and
to cross-subsidize local services. Globerman, supra note 4, at 22.
191. Sondhof & Theurer, supra note 4, at 181.
192. GG art. 87(f) (F.R.G.).
193. Gesetz fiber Fernmeldeanlagen [Law on Telecommunications Equipment] (FAG) § 8
v. 3.7.1989 (BGBI. I S.1455).
194. Haid & Miller, supra note 60, § 6.1.
195. Gesetz fiber die Regulierung der Telekommunikation und des Postwesens [Law on
Regulating the Postal Services and Telecommunications] (PTRegG) § 16, v. 14.9.1994
(BGBI. I S.2325). The TKG as of December 31, 1997, will supersede this law.
196. Id. § 2(2).
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The EU continues to wrestle with its own definition of universal
service. This has implications for the TKG and other European telecommu-
nications laws which must be drafted in line with the EU's directives.
European Union Industry Commissioner Martin Bangemann stated that
universal service should mean that all EU citizens have access to an equal
quality of service at a reasonable price.
97
Equally important is the question of who must pay to provide
universal service. The European Commission approved a requirement that
all network and service providers who have greater than 25 percent market
share must contribute to financing universal service within the Communi-
ty. 198
b. The TKG
The TKG provides authority for the federal government to assure
universal service.'99 Universal service is defined as a minimum level of
telecommunications service, available to persons and businesses at any
location, and at an affordable price.200 The federal government is to
determine, subject to the consents of the Bundesrat and Bundestag, what
constitutes universal service, the minimum level of quality of service that
must be provided to satisfy the requirement, and a reasonable price.20'
Both social and technical developments are to be considered in defining and
202Th NRdetermining universal services. The NRA is then empowered to
determine whether universal service is actually being provided.2 3
The Legislative Report to the Original Draft states that the basic
operating definition of universal service includes basic voice telephony and
the necessary connection to the system that the public has come to expect
as available.2' °  Further, the market penetration rate (the number of
197. European Parliament Draft Directive Moves EU Closer to Open Telecom Networks,
Daily Report for Executives (BNA) at 3 (Feb. 15, 1996) (Minister Bangemann stated that
universal service did not 'necessarily mean a public service, but rather that all EU citizens,
wherever they may be, should have the same quality of service at an affordable price. It's
a civil right to participate in the services offered by the information network--and a public
service is not necessarily the best way of achieving that objective."').
198. EU Telecom Ministers Take Steps Toward European Telecom Deregulation, supra
note 5, at 2.
199. Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) § 17(2), v. 1.8.1996 (BGBI. I S. 1120).
200. Id. § 17(l). The Bundesrat sought to remove "minimum" from the description and
to keep the definition as broad as possible. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 32.
201. TKG § 17(2).
202. Id. § 17(2). This sentence was added in the final version of the TKG. Compare TKG
§ 17(2) with June Dra, supra note 3, § 16(2).
203. TKG § 17(2).
204. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, at 34-35.
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telephone hookups) in 1996 constitutes the baseline for universal service.
However, the law takes into account that the industry is everchanging and
that technological advances regularly continue. Accordingly, what will
satisfy the universal service requirement shall vary depending upon what
services are prevalent in the market and come to be considered indispens-
able.20
5
The TKG also begins with the operating assumption that the market
will fulfill universal service requirements.26 However the TKG also grants
the NRA authority to intervene to ensure that universal service requirements
are satisfied should the market fail.
If universal service is not being provided, or where it appears likely
that universal service will not be provided, all licensees operating in the
applicable licensed market and who have at least a 4 percent market share
in the relevant market as defined by the Competition Law, are obliged to
contribute to ensuring that the universal service is provided.207 This
obligation extends to other companies constituting a single company
together with the licensee operating in the market.20 8
Where the NRA determines that satisfactory universal service is not
being provided in a particular market, it must first publish this determina-
tion in its official gazette. If within one month following publication no
market provider declares its intent to provide service that will satisfy
universal service requirements, the NRA may require a licensee holding a
market dominant position in the relevant product and geographical market
to provide the service. 209 Where several licensees hold dominant positions
in the relevant market, and after hearing concerned parties, the NRA may
choose to obligate one or more licensees to provide part or all of the
universal service in question. However, any licensee obligated in this way
may not be unduly prejudiced in relation to other licensees.210 This
potential obligation to provide also extends to other companies constituting
a single company together with the licensee(s).2 '
205. TKG § 17(1).
206. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 17.
207. TKG § 18(1). The January Draft required participation of providers with 5% or
greater market participation. January Draft, supra note 3, § 17(1). The Bundesrat had
suggested considering a figure lower than 5% in order to broaden participation. Bundesrat
Opinion, supra note 76, § 37.
208. TKG § 18(2). See infra note 254 and accompanying text (discussing definition of
a single company).
209. TKG § 19(2).
210. Id. § 19(3).
211. Id. § 19(4) (referring to the creation of a single company through linkage of
companies within section 23 of the Competition Law).
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Licensees obligated to provide universal service are entitled to receive
compensation for actual long-term costs incurred in providing that
service.212 Such costs are computed following a complete calendar year
in which the licensee experiences a deficit based upon providing the
universal service.213
In cases where the NRA selects a licensee to provide universal service
as described above, the licensee may provide evidence that it will be able
to claim compensation for providing the service.214 If a licensee furnishes
primafacie evidence that it will be entitled to compensation, the NRA may,
in lieu of obligating one or more companies to provide service as described
above, solicit bids for the provision of the service.215 In that case, the
NRA will select the bidder showing sufficient qualification to provide
universal service and requiring the "least financial compensation there-
for."21 6 This solicitation process may also be used where the primary
selection process is not possible.21 7
All licensees operating in the relevant product market for the licensed
telecommunications service in question and that account for at least 4
percent of the total sales in that market, must together provide compensation
to a licensee entitled to compensation.218 The amount that each licensee
must pay is determined pro rata based upon the licensee's share of
sales.2  Annually, each licensee must report its revenues in that market
to the NRAY21
2. The United States
a. The Law Leading to the Telecommunications Act of 1996
The United States inherited from English common law the principle
of the "common carrier," defined as entities that provided essential services
in a non-discriminatory manner. In exchange for providing such servic-
es--the operation of a ferry boat or wharf, for example--the carrier
received a limitation on its liabilities, as befitting for an entity which could
212. Id. § 20(1).
213. Id. § 20(2). This could lead to a great deal of accounting problems as market partici-
pants may try to shift competitive costs into this area in order to get reimbursement.
Raimund Schtitz & Michael Esser-Welli6, Wettbewerb in der Telekommunikation?
[Competition in Telecommunications?], AFP, Mar. 1995, at 580, 584.
214. TKG § 19(5).
215. Id. § 19(5).
216. Id. § 19(5).
217. Id. § 19(6).
218. Id. § 21(1).
219. Id. § 21(2).
220. Id. § 22(1).
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not discriminate among its customers.221 By contrast, non-common
(private) carriers then provided niche services for private parties.
Difficulties result where there is intermingling of the two types of
services-an increasingly common occurrence. 22 For example, noncom-
mon carriers are not burdened by universal service requirements, providing
an advantage where there is competition between common and noncommon
carriers. Courts, regulators, and Congress have typically attempted to
equalize such situations.223
The provision of universal service is one of the basic tenets of the
common carriage system. As networks are increasingly privatized and
particularly where networks can be divided into different market segments,
the danger of loss of service in less profitable areas increases. Accordingly,
some substitute for the government-imposed universal service previously
provided by national telecommunications networks was considered
necessary.
The FCC has as a central goal that the telecommunications system
provide universal service at reasonable prices. Section 151 of the 1934 Act
established the FCC "[fjor the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign
commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so
far as possible, to all the people of the United States... a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges . . . ."'
While achieving universal service is a primary goal of the FCC, no
law actually requires universal service. Rather, the 1934 Act disallows the
withdrawal of service without FCC or state approval. This effectively
creates universal service availability because of the unfavorable political
response at the state level that a petition to withdraw service would
generate. The federal standard for approval of withdrawal is: "[N]o carrier
shall discontinue, reduce, or impair service to a community, or part of a
community, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the
Commission a certificate that neither the present nor future public
convenience and necessity will be adversely affected thereby."225 As a
practical matter, no one files applications to withdraw service except for the
221. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 1.3.1.
222. Rob Frieden, Contamination of the Common Carrier Concept in Telecommunica-
tions, TELECOMM. POL'Y 685 (1996). Attempts by the FCC to establish "bright line"
distinctions between basic common carrier functions and enhanced service functions which
are not regulated failed. Instead, the FCC opted for safeguards involving accounting
standards and a complaint process in place of structural separation and safeguards. Id. n. 10.
223. Id. at 686.
224. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1995).
225. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1995).
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most esoteric and ancient of services: wire telegraphy services and maritime
common carrier operations that often predate the Federal Radio Act of
1926.
However, beyond merely ensuring that service lines remained actually
in place, regulators believed that a key to achieving the goal of universal
service, or at least near universal, was keeping the cost of local service low.
To this end, local service rates were subsidized in three ways. 6 First,
higher long-distance rates were intended to offset lower local rates.'
Second, rural rates were subsidized by higher urban rates through rate
averaging. And third, business customers subsidized residential custom-
ers. 8 The fear has always been that to increase local rates to bring them
in line with actual cost of service would end up causing significant numbers
of individuals to give up service. However, a recent study has shown that
setting local rates at levels closer to actual cost does not significantly
change rates of connection. 9
b. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The 1996 Act establishes a Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service made up of federal and state-appointed representatives and a State-
appointed utility consumer advocate.23 The Joint Board is to issue
recommendations to the FCC concerning: preserving and advancing
universal service. It is to focus on availability of quality services at "just,
reasonable and affordable rates"; access to advanced service; access in rural
and high cost areas; equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions by all
226. Telephone subsidies to local service towards the end of keeping costs low is
estimated at between $17.5-$20 billion per year. Craig D. Dingwall, The Last Mile: A Race
for Local Telecommunications Competition Policy, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 105, 120 (1995).
227. For example, a study showed that Pacific Bell charged $8.35 per month for basic
service, while its marginal costs were estimated to be $22 per month for that service. The
subsidization was provided by inflated interLATA toll charges, access charges, and yellow
pages rates. Bhaskar Chakravorti & Yossef Spiegel, The Political Economy of Entry Into
Local Exchange Markets, in QUALITY AND RELIABILITY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRA-
STRUCTURE 43, at 44 (William Lehr ed., 1995).
228. See Peter K. Pitsch & David P. Teolis, Price Reform & Universal Service: Not
Mutually Exclusive, PUB. UTIL. REP., Mar. 15, 1996, at 29 (reporting that where rate
restructuring took place in Illinois no statistically significant drop in household penetration
rates took place).
However, adding competition in the local market reverses the business to residential
subsidy. Because a small number of large business customers provide a LEC's greatest
revenues, the LEC must offer significant cost savings as incentives to prevent the large
customers from utilizing a bypass and thereby depriving the LEC of these revenues. Eli M.
Noam, supra note 56, at 221.
229. Chakravorti & Spiegel, supra note 227, at 44.
230. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
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telecommunications service providers; specific and predictable support
mechanisms for the provision of universal service; access to advanced
telecommunications services for schools, health care facilities, and libraries;
and such additional principles as the Board and FCC consider "necessary
and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience and
necessity, and are consistent with [the 1996 Act]. '' 231 Universal service is
to be made available to consumers "at rates that are just, reasonable, and
affordable. 232
The 1996 Act declares universal service to be an "evolving level of
telecommunications services.,, 233 The definition must take into account
advances in telecommunications and information technology. Moreover, its
decisions:
shall consider the extent to which such telecommunications services-
(A) are essential to education, public health, or public safety;
(B) have, through the operation of market choices by customers, been
subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers;
(C) are being deployed in public telecommunications networks by
telecommunications carriers; and
(D) are consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessi-ty. 234
All telecommunications carriers that provide interstate telecommunica-
tions are obligated to contribute "on an equitable and nondiscriminatory
basis, to the specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by
the Commission to preserve and advance universal service." Where a
carrier's activities are so small that its contribution would be de minimus
(that is, where collection costs would exceed the amount the carrier
contributed), then the carrier may be exempted. Conversely, other interstate
telecommunications providers may also be required to contribute where the
FCC finds it in the public interest.235
Where universal service is not provided in a community, the FCC or
the state may select a particular common carrier to provide such service.
Such carriers are referred to as "eligible telecommunications carriers. '236
231. Id. § 254(b).
232. Id. § 254(i).
233. Id. § 254(c)(1). Apparently, too much flexibility may not be a good thing: House
Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee Chairman Jack Fields (R-Tex.) questioned
FCC Chairman Reed Hundt regarding alleged FCC consideration of a plan to provide pagers
to the homeless as a part of the FCC's implementation of the 1996 Act's universal service
provisions. Chris McConnell, FCC Grilled on New Role, BRDCST. & CABLE, Apr. 1, 1996,
at 18 (reporting congressional interest in overhauling FCC).
234. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(c)(1).
235. Id. § 254(d).
236. Id. § 214(e)(2).
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Incumbent LECs are required to make their public switched-network
infrastructure, technology, information, and telecommunications facilities
and functions available to requesting small universal services providers in
its area.237 An eligible carrier may only relinquish this designation where
at least one other carrier serves the area and where the state approves the
request.238
Eligible carriers may then receive support payments to preserve and
advance universal service under section 254(e).239 However, cross-
subsidization between competitive and non-competitive services is not
allowed; the FCC and the states may establish accounting rules to ensure
that costs allocated to facilities used to provide universal service are
reasonable.240
The 1996 Act also incorporates the pre-existing practice that rates be
subject to geographic averaging and rate integration for long-distance
telecommunications in order to ensure that rates for rural and urban
customers be comparable. Moreover, long-distance service rates may not
vary between states.241
The 1996 Act also includes provisions requiring that telecommunica-
tions carriers provide affordable access to their services to health care
providers in rural areas, elementary and secondary schools, and public
libraries. Rural health care providers are to receive services at rates no
higher than those afforded urban providers, and schools and public libraries
are to receive discounted rates set by the FCC.
2 42
3. Comparison and Conclusions
Both the TKG and the 1996 Act have adopted extremely broad
definitions of universal service. The goal is that both systems remain
flexible for responding to ever advancing technology: Today's exotic
features may well become tomorrow's most common services. This broad
definition provides regulators with more flexibility in setting regulations in
this area.
Essentially, both the TKG and the 1996 Act take the same basic
approach to ensuring that universal service is provided. Wherever the NRA
or FCC determines that universal service is lacking, it may select one or
more carriers in the area to provide the required service, thereby making the
237. Id. § 259(a).
238. Id. § 214(e)(4).
239. Id. § 214(e)(1).
240. Id. § 254(k).
241. Id. § 254(g).
242. Id. § 254(h).
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burdened carrier eligible to receive funds from the universal service fund.
However, differences exist between those that may be required to provide
such services. The TKG limits carriers that may be required to provide
service to those with 4 percent or greater market share while the 1996 Act
makes any market participant potentially available to provide service.
The TKG's approach to paying for provision of universal service
appears to trade breadth of contribution for simplicity. Its requirement that
carriers with at least four percent of the market contribute to the common
fund may be relatively simple to calculate-in contrast to the U.S. system
where all carriers must contribute unless administration costs would be
greater than the contribution-but may well exclude a substantial number
of market participants, particularly in the early period of growing competi-
tion. Although the U.S. system appears more analysis intensive, in practice
it will probably be relatively simple to perform basic calculations concern-
ing administration costs, and thereby easy to compare each market
participant's required contribution against the pre-calculated costs.
Accordingly, the U.S. system probably provides a fairer method of
distributing costs. Perhaps once a more competitive environment has been
established, Germany may want to set a lower threshold in order to provide
for a fairer distribution of universal service burden throughout the industry.
However, the interesting difference between the two systems results
from their different starting points. Although the German system has always
explicitly required the provision of universal service, until passage of the
1996 Act, the U.S. system had only indirectly required universal service-in
that service was already in place in all regions, and that approval was
required in order to withdraw services. Conceivably, absent some sort of
service provision requirement, upon complete privatization in 1998, Telekom
could simply stop providing service in unprofitable areas. Although
extremely unpopular politically, it could be highly advantageous economi-
cally, given varying degrees of profitability between areas and the
requirement that service be provided at an affordable price-a requirement
that automatically calls for some degree of rate averaging. Here, the
provision of universal service becomes linked to licensing. Under a
completely unfettered licensing scheme, firms could engage in cherry-
picking in order to provide service only to the most cost-effective areas,
leaving out those areas where provision of service would be most
expensive.243
The U.S. system should be able to avoid this problem because the
United States is already divided into 161 LATAs, each encompassing an
243. See, e.g., Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 1.
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average of 1.2 million persons and 600,000 telephone connections.2"
These LATAs are already serviced by the various BOCs, which are subject
to the section 214(a) requirement of the 1934 Act that service not be
withdrawn from an area absent FCC consent. Accordingly, local universal
service will remain in place, particularly given that the 1934 Act provides
authority for universal service providers to be appointed where service is
lacking.
Perhaps establishing some sort of similar framework in Germany could
resolve some universal service provision problems. If service regions are
established such that more and less expensive regions are linked together
in such a way that most service regions had roughly equivalent overall
profitability potential, the risk that less densely populated areas would be
provided less favorable services would be lessened.
Alternatively, the NRA may invoke its authority under section 18 of
the TKG to designate carriers in certain areas where universal service is not
being provided. On the one hand, this seems to represent a more piece-meal
approach than setting up a pre-existing structure. However, on the other
hand, it could well be that a regional system devised by a governmental
body would not represent economic realities as well as would a market-
based system derived from license applications themselves.
C. Market Dominance Regulation
Because it takes some time before alternate networks are established
to compete with those of former monopolies, competitors must initially
utilize a former monopoly's networks and services. Accordingly, protection
against abuse of a market dominant position is necessary in newly
liberalized telecommunications industries.245
1. Germany
a. The Law Leading to the TKG
As discussed above in respect to interconnection, historically the
market consisted only of the state-run telephone system. Accordingly,
whether the state enterprise abused its market position was more a political
than a legal question-as the controversy over the telephone rate structure
244. Sondhof & Theurer, supra note 4, at 180.
245. Both AT&T and British Telecom have maintained their status as primary providers
despite the passage of more than eleven years since the end of their monopolies. Kammholz,
supra note 51, at 29.
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that went into effect on January 1, 1996 showed.246
EU law applies for purposes of ensuring that the state-run telephone
system does not violate article 90 or article 30 of the EC Treaty.
247
Moreover, EU ministers continue to discuss the definition of a market
dominant enterprise within the context of the telecommunications market.
To date, the EU Council of Ministers for Telecommunications has
apparently agreed in principle that its draft directive will define an
enterprise with greater than 25 percent market share as market dominant,
but with some flexibility built into the system for individual state imple-
mentation." The European Commission will continue to exercise
authority over the telecommunications market in Germany and throughout
the EU, providing another layer of regulatory oversight beyond the NRA
and Cartel Office.249
b. The TKG
While competition is set to begin on January 1, 1998, it will, in all
246. Imposition of new telephone rates resulted in a major public uproar because of
questions concerning the new rates. Telekom advertised the new rates as a substantial rate
reduction because it reduced the basic cost of a basic telephone calling "unit" [einheit].
Controversy arose over whether or not, in combination with other changes in the rate
calculation system, the overall result was a net increase or decrease in calling prices for
consumers. See, e.g., Postminister verlangt Oberprifung neuer Ortsgesprdchsgebiihren
[Ministerfor Postal Service Demands Review ofNew Local Call Rates], AP WORLDSTREAM-
GERMAN, Jan. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, APGRMN File.
All telephone calls in Germany are billed on the basis of how many units [einheiten]
the customer uses. All calls use at least one unit-there is no flat rate for unlimited local
calling. Customers pay DM 0,12 (approximately 8 cents) for each unit. Depending upon the
time of day, each unit is of a different length. For example, one unit lasts four minutes if
a customer calls the store across the street between 12:00 midnight and 5:00 a.m. (the least
expensive calling period). By contrast, a unit would last only 45 seconds if the same call is
placed between 9:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon (the most expensive calling period). The customer
receives a bill indicating the number of units used during the month and pays DM 0,12 per
unit. In contrast to U.S. telephone company bills, there is no list of telephone numbers
called. Most German telephones have a unit counter that indicates the units as they are used
during a telephone call and keeps a running total.
247. For discussion of EU law application, see Haar, supra note 18, 550-56.
248. See EU's Council of Ministers reaches agreement on interconnection, TELECOM
MARKETs, Mar. 28, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8687912 (reporting March 21, 1996 EU
Council of Ministers for Telecommunications meeting). See Legislative resolution embodying
Parliament's opinion on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on
interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and
interoperability through application of the principles on open network provision (ONP), 1996
O.J. (C 65).
249. See, e.g., Schuster, supra note 77 (reporting the European Commission's
involvement following competitor complaints that Telekom was abusing its market dominant
position in offering customer rebates in 1996).
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likelihood, be some time before Telekom is dislodged from its position as
the sole market dominant provider."' As the incumbent carrier, Telekom
begins with many advantages over its fledgling competitors, including its
2511existing network and name recognition.
The TKG is particularly concerned with protecting the market from the
control of a market dominant enterprise-meaning Telekom.252 Telekom
has criticized its special status, arguing that looming competitors like the
big energy concerns that have existing networks and have entered into
alliances with large international enterprises do not need regulatory
protection. However, many observers consider the special regulation
necessary to nurture and protect competition in the developing market.
253
The TKG pays special attention to market dominant providers and
affirms the applicability of antitrust law to telecommunications provid-
ers." The TKG refrains from establishing a unique definition for market
dominant position in the telecommunications industry. Rather, it defers to
section 22(1) of the Competition Law for the determination of whether an
entity is market dominant:255
(1) An enterprise is market dominating within the meaning of this Act
if it, either as one offering or calling for a specific kind of goods or
commercial services,
250. One estimate expects Telekom to maintain a 77.5% domestic market share in the
year 2000. Kammholz, supra note 51, at 29.
251. However, it has the drawback of having to cope with pre-existing enormous debts
and pension obligations and how to rid itself of its vastly excessive force of state workers
who are entitled to keep their jobs. HAAR, supra note 39, at 320.
252. Telekom is the third largest telecommunications provider in the world, after NTT and
AT&T. Joachim Sondermann, Dem Riesen Telekom stehen spannende Zeiten bevor [The
Giant Telekom to Experience Exciting Times], AP WORLDSTREAM-GERMAN, Oct. 17, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, APGRMN File.
253. Telekom bef/lrchtet Oberregulierung auf dem Weg in den Wettbewerb, supra note
127, at 19.
254. See Haar, supra note 18, at 528 (arguing that the U.S. experience shows that a
'functioning competitive market requires effective antitrust law regulating the structure of the
market, and that mere individual legal protections are insufficient).
255. See Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) §§ 14, 19, 24, 25, 32, 33, 34, 35 v. 1.8.1996
(BGBI. I S.1 120). Earlier drafts considered using 25% market share as a trigger for market-
dominant position, but the utility of such a bright-line definition was questionable. Alterna-
tively, a definition that considered whether a market-participant controlled a choke-point for
other users' access to networks might have been useful. Hiltl & GroBmann, supra note 7,
at 173, n.36.
A recent proposal to the EC in this area would use 25% market share as the point
triggering a presumption of a market dominant position. EU Telecom Ministers Take Steps
Toward European Telecom Deregulation, supra note 5, at 5. See Proposal for a European
Parliament and Council Directive amending Council Directives 90/387 and 92/44 for the
purpose of adaptation to a competitive environment in telecommunications, 96/C 62/04, No.
C 62/C, Mar. 1, 1996.
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1. is without competitors or is subject to no substantial competi-
tion; or
2. has a superior market position in relation to its competitors; in
this connection, in addition to its market share, regard shall be
given in particular to its financial strength, its access to the
supply and sales markets, its inter-relationships with other
enterprises as well as to legal or factual barriers to the entry of
other enterprises into the market, the ability to direct its supply
or demand to other goods or commercial services, as well as the
possibility of the opposite market side to change to other
enterprises."6
Part III of the Original Draft was entitled "Regulation of Market
Dominant Providers" but was renamed as "Rates Regulation" in the law as
passed.2 7 A comparison of the changes to Part I, however, shows
relatively little difference between the January Draft and June Draft beyond
the title change. As evidenced by the Bundesrat ' proposals, some objected
to the part's limitation in scope merely to dominant providers. 258 Accord-
ingly, the rules in this section, while to a large extent focused upon large
market participants, do not always apply exclusively to market dominators.
For example, all terms and conditions for licensed telecommunications
services and for universal service are subject to NRA scrutiny to ensure that
256. I BusiNEss TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, supra note 110, at app. 3-16 to -17. The
section continues:
(2) Furthermore, two or more enterprises shall be deemed to be market dominating
insofar as, for factual reasons, substantial competition between them for a specific
kind of goods or commercial services does not exist, either generally or in specific
markets, and insofar as they in their entirety fulfill the conditions of subsection
(1).
(3) It shall be presumed that
1. an enterprise is market dominating within the meaning of subsection (1)
if it has a market share of at least one-third for a specific kind of goods
or commercial services; this presumption shall not apply if the turnover
proceeds of the enterprise during the last preceding business year
amounted to less than 250 million Deutsche Marks;
2. the conditions specified in subsection (2) are fulfilled if, with respect to
a specific kind of goods or commercial services,
a) three or fewer enterprises together have a market share of 50
percent or more; or
b) five or fewer enterprises together have a market share of two-thirds
or more;
this presumption shall not apply insofar as enterprises are concerned whose
turnover proceeds during the last preceding business year amounted to less than
100 million Deutsche Marks. § 23(1), sentences 2-10, shall apply analogously to
the computation of market shares and turnover proceeds.
Id. at app. 3-17.
257. See supra note 132.
258. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76.
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they comply with EU requirements, regardless of an enterprise's size.259
The TKG provides corporate structuring rules for market dominant
providers in general and special rules and obligations for market dominant
providers, variously defined, in the areas of provision of universal services,
rates regulation, and open network provision and interconnection. These
sector-specific market position abuse regulations, however, create a
potentially cumbersome and conflict-creating situation for an enterprise. In
some situations, a telecommunications enterprise operating in a nonlicensed
area is governed merely by Competition Law requirements and is subject
to Federal Cartel Office oversight. However, where it is operating in
licensed areas it is subject to NRA oversight and possibly to Cartel Office
oversight as well.
260
Turning now to specific sections of the TKG, section 14(1) provides
that companies enjoying a market dominant position in markets other than
telecommunications must establish legally independent companies for the
carrying of telecommunications services. Market dominance is again defined
according to section 22 of the Competition Law.26" ' Moreover, section
14(2) provides that companies dominating a telecommunications market
segregate their accounting for services provided in a licensed sector from
those provided in nonlicensed sectors. The NRA may dictate the structure
of accounting practices for services subject to license. The goal is to avoid
cross-subsidization particularly where proceeds from licensed, monopoly
services could be used to subsidize services in nonlicensed, competitive
sectors.262
As discussed above,261 section 18(1) provides that where an element
of universal service is not provided as required under section 17(1), every
licensee that is active in the relevant area of the telecommunications market
and either (1) holds at least 4 percent of the market that falls within the
TKG's scope of coverage or (2) holds a market dominant position in the
relevant geographical market as defined under section 22 of the Competition
Law, is obligated to assist with assuring that the element of universal
service is provided in that market. This section applies not only to a
telecommunications provider itself but also to any other entity which is
259. TKG § 23(l).
260. Kammholz, supra note 51, at 21.
261. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
262. But ef. Alexander C. Larson, Reforming Telecommunications Policy in Response to
Entry into Local Exchange Markets, 18 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 21 (1995) (arguing
that "leverage theory," whereby dominance in one market is used to assist in another market,
is relatively discredited in antitrust theory).
263. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
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connected to the telecommunications provider so as to constitute a single
entity within the meaning of section 23 of the Competition Law.
2 4
By contrast, section 19(2) narrows the pool of companies potentially
obligated to provide service under section 18(1); section 19(2) provides that
companies holding a dominant position under section 22 of the Competition
Law in "the relevant product and geographical market" may be obligated
to provide a universal service that is lacking. Section 21(1) provides that
licensees operating in the relevant product market and who hold at least 4
percent of that market must contribute to the compensation of eligible
companies based on their provision of a universal service.
Part III also imposes rate regulation upon those holding a market
dominant position within the relevant market.265 Proposed rates will be
evaluated based upon either the costs of efficiently providing the individual
service in question or upon a prescribed average change in rates for a basket
of combined services.2s Moreover, as an overall matter, all rates, not just
those of market dominant providers, must not be based upon abuse of a
market dominant position, contain discounts that unfairly prejudice some
market participants, or create advantages for some market participants in
relation to identically situated market participants.267
Finally, Part I prohibits certain mergers among market dominant
providers. Where the number of licenses granted has been limited pursuant
to section 10, section 23 authorizes the NRA to condition a license granted
to a market dominant provider upon the provider's refraining from merging
with another service provider.2 68 Combination is defined in terms of
264. Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) § 18(2), v. 1.8.1996 (BGB1. I S.1120). Section
18(2) refers to sections 23(1) sentence 2 and (2) and (3) of the Competition Law for the
definition of a "linkage of companies." Section 23 of the Competition Law, entitled "Report
of Mergers" contains definitions of combinations of companies and mergers. BusINESs
TRANsACTIONs IN GERMANY, supra note 110, at app. 3-18 to -22.
265. TKG § 25(1). The qualification "in the relevant market" was added to the June 5,
1996 Draft. Under the earlier draft, rate regulation under this section was to be applied to
those holding a market dominant position in any market. Compare January Draft, supra note
3, § 24(l)-(2) with June Draft, supra note 3, § 24. Old section 24 is renumbered as
section 25 in the TKG.
266. TKG § 27(1). Consistent with its goal of establishing greater authority over the
regulation process, the Bundesrat sought to have the NRA's regulations concerning
remuneration be subject to its approval. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 43. The TKG
explicitly states that regulations in this area that are promulgated by the German federal
government do not require the approval of the Bundesrat. TKG § 27(4).
267. TKG § 24.
268. Again, the Bundesrat unsuccessfully sought to have this authority apply to all
providers, not merely market dominant enterprises. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 46.
The Bundesrat also unsuccessfully proposed that regulations in this area be subject to
Bundesrat approval. Id. § 48.
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section 23 of the Competition Law.
269
Part IV, Open Network Provision and Interconnection, focuses special
attention on providers that hold a market dominant position in telecommuni-
cations markets. Section 33(1) requires that such providers allow competi-
tors non-discriminatory access to essential services that the provider itself
uses. Access may only be restricted to the extent allowed under EU
requirements. Abuse of a market dominant position will be presumed
where a provider holding a dominant position in the relevant market fails
to provide such access.271 Moreover, a provider of telecommunications
services to the public that is dominant in such market must allow other
users access to its network or to parts thereof.22 This requirement is
extended to other companies that together constitute a single company with
the provider as defined by section 23 of the Competition Law. All
agreements granting access under this section are also subject to this
restriction--that they may not be likely to prejudice the "competitive
opportunities" of other companies unless there is an objective justification
for such prejudicial effect. 3
2. The United States
a. The Law Leading to the Telecommunications Act of 1996
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolistic behavior,274 and
abuse of a market dominant position is regulated under this category.275
Dominant carriers were considered those with "market power," defined as
the ability to set prices independently.27 6 While antitrust laws were not
inapplicable to the Bell system, it received special treatment vis-h-vis
antitrust law requirements because it was a state-sanctioned monopoly.
Nonetheless, throughout its history, the Bell System was subject to antitrust
suits, threats of suits, and consent decree requirements based on its
dominance in the telecommunications market. Many of these suits
concerned mergers and potential mergers in various market segments.
269. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
270. TKG § 33(1).
271. Id. § 33(2). The June Draft added some flexibility to this presumption, allowing such
a provider to show objective justification for the less favorable conditions. See June Draft,
supra note 3, at 25. This flexibility remains in the TKG as passed.
272. TKG § 35(l).
273. Id. § 38(1).
274. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1995).
275. PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, III ANTITRUST LAW 600-30 (1987).
276. Herbert E. Marks, Two Decades of Telecommunications Regulation: An Historical
Perspective, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW, supra note 117, at 111, 120.
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Regulation of market dominant carriers had been simple to categorize
until recently: The BOCs and the independents were monopoly LECs in
their regions, and AT&T was the dominant international and domestic long-
distance carrier. 77 As such, they have been subject to a complex set of
antitrust rules based on the fact that telephone service was traditionally
treated as a public utility. This resulted in a mixture of special legal rules
which provided both advantages and disadvantages for these market
dominators.z8
One of these special rules was FCC authority to grant immunity from
antitrust laws for some mergers and consolidations within the telecommuni-
cations industry. In deciding whether to grant antitrust immunity, "[i]n
general, the public interest is to be considered in light of the overall purpose
of the Communications Act 'to make available, so far as possible, to all
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges ... ,,.279 Where the FCC found that a "proposed consolidation,
acquisition, or control will be of advantage to the persons to whom service
is to be rendered and in the public interest, it shall certify to that effect; and
thereupon any Act or Acts of Congress making the proposed transaction
unlawful shall not apply."280 The 1996 Act repealed this section.
One important aspect of regulating market dominant actors has been
cross-subsidization rules aimed at preventing dominant carriers from using
revenues from basic regulated services to subsidize provision of non-
regulated services (in other words, enhanced services). Accordingly,
dominant carriers have been required to adopt FCC-approved accounting
rules to allow for adequate oversight over this potential problem.2"'
277. FCC regulation divides IXCs into two groups: dominant and nondominant carriers.
Until recently, AT&T was the dominant carrier and all others were nondominant. KENNEDY,
supra note 57, at 85. Today, AT&T is only considered dominant for purposes of
international communications. In re Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-
Dominant Carrier, Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 3271, 1 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 63 (1995).
278. For example, while AT&T enjoyed certain benefits in being the designated
monopoly in certain areas, it became increasingly interested in the potential benefits of a
competitive environment because it could gain access to markets from which it was denied
access based on its special status. Marks, supra note 272, at 119-20.
For explanation and analysis of U.S. antitrust law generally and its specific application
to the telecommunications industry, see, for example, HAAR, supra note 39, at 96-105.
279. Mid-Texas Comm. v. AT&T, 615 F.2d 1372, 1379 (5th Cir. 1980).
280. 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1995), repealed by Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
281. KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 68.
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b. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The 1996 Act focuses on the BOCs with regard to regulating market
dominance. It seeks to ensure a workable transition from the present
situation where the BOCs are the sole LECs to a competitive future since
a major purpose of the 1996 Act is to open local exchange service to
competition. Correspondingly, the BOCs are now able to enter the
interLATA market. However, given the dominance of the BOCs in the local
exchange market, special rules require that actual competition exist in a
BOC's region before the BOC would be allowed to offer interLATA service
that originates in its local exchange service area.2"
Specifically, a BOC must obtain FCC authorization prior to offering
interLATA services within its region. In order to obtain authorization, the
BOC must satisfy interconnection requirements and the "in-region" test.
Section 271(c) first requires that either the BOC has entered into one
or more binding agreements concerning access and interconnection with a
"facilities-based competitor" that exists in the BOC's region, or that no
competitor has requested access and interconnection within the region.283
A facilities-based competitor is one that offers either telephone exchange
service exclusively over its own facilities or predominately over its own
with some resale of another carrier's services. The competitor must be
operational, actually offering competitive services and not merely having
entered into agreements with the BOC.2  Congress sought to ensure that
an unaffiliated competing provider exists in the region; not just a reseller
of the BOC's services. 285 Alternatively, the section is satisfied where,
despite the BOC's offering interconnection and access to its network, no
other carrier applies to enter the region within ten months of the 1996 Act's
enactment.286 In addition, the actual access and interconnection either
provided or offered must include reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms
for interconnection, unbundled service access, and nondiscriminatory access
to ducts, poles, conduits and rights-of-way of the BOC.287
282. InterLATA services that originate outside its in-region state and incidental
interLATA services are not included in this requirement. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(6)(2)(B) (West
Supp. 1996).
283. Id. § 271(c)(1)(A).
284. S. REP. No. 104-230, at 148 (1996).
285. Id.
286. 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(1)(B).
287. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B). Section 271(c) also prohibits a BOC from offering interLATA
services jointly with another telecommunications carrier that has more than 5% of the
nation's presubscribed access lines for three years after the date of enactment, or until the
BOC receives permission to offer interLATA services within its state.
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However, a sufficiently separate affiliate of a BOC which is an
incumbent LEC may provide interLATA services, even where the above
interconnection and in-region requirements are not met. Section 272 allows
provision of such services, and other BOC-prohibited services such as
manufacturing and interLATA information services, where they are carried
out through an affiliate and all transactions are at arm's length and without
any special preference for the affiliate's services."'
Significantly, the 1996 Act also repealed section 221(a) of the 1934
Act, which gave the FCC the power to provide antitrust exceptions to
mergers within the industry, to avoid circumvention of the antitrust laws.
This was done largely in anticipation of anticipated mergers between
telephone and cable television companies. Congress was concerned that
distinctions between the two industries will become less clear and it wanted
to preserve adequate antitrust supervision where increasing industry
consolidation could raise concerns about potential remonopolization:
8 9
Mergers between [cable and telephone] companies should not be
allowed to go through without a thorough antitrust review under the
normal Hart-Scott-Rodino process.. . .By returning review of mergers
in a competitive industry to the DOJ, this repeal would be consistent
with one of the underlying themes of the bill--to get both agencies
back to their proper roles and to end government by consent decree.
The Commission should be carrying out the policies of the Communi-
cations Act, and the DOJ should be carrying out the policies of the
antitrust laws. 290
3. Comparison and Conclusions
The TKG and 1996 Act take similar approaches regarding general
regulatory oversight and seeking to prevent cross-subsidization. Both the
German and U.S. systems begin with readily identifiable market dominators:
Telekom in Germany and AT&T in international long-distance service and
the BOCs in local exchange service in the United States.29 However,
while the TKG needed to address virtually the entire telecommunications
industry in Germany, because the U.S. long-distance market has been open
to competition for more than a decade, the 1996 Act could focus its
attention on local service.
In terms of defining a market dominant enterprise, like U.S. law, the
TKG sometimes takes a more flexible approach than that of the EU. The
288. Id. § 272.
289. S. REP. No. 104-230, at 200-01.
290. Id. at 201.
291. See text accompanying supra note 277 (discussing classification of AT&T as market
dominant in long-distance markets).
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former looks to the size and power of the enterprise in relation to the
market while the EU appears ready to set down 25 percent of market share
as the base line. This 25 percent base line was proposed and rejected early
in the TKG legislative process.292 However, as evidenced above in the
discussion of the rules requiring market dominant companies to provide
universal services, the TKG provides varying market dominance definitions
for different aspects of the requirement to provide universal service. This
seems like a recipe for confusion. While this series of definitions undoubt-
edly is intended to most appropriately distribute responsibilities among the
players in various telecommunications markets, it may serve to create
artificial, market-distorting distinctions among companies within the
industry.
The 1996 Act resolves a potential problem that remains a part of the
TKG, that of conflicts between cartel regulators and telecommunications
regulators. The 1996 Act explicitly takes antitrust waiver authority away
from the FCC and places antitrust regulation of the industry squarely in the
hands of the Department of Justice. This is particularly important given that
cable television, telecommunications, and other media companies will
become increasingly intermixed, requiring antitrust oversight by one agency
that is capable of such a broad task. By contrast, the TKG establishes a dual
regulatory system that could lead to inconsistent decisions coming from the
NRA and the Cartel Office. As the telecommunications market becomes
more and more a "normal" private undertaking, and less a government-
owned or oriented utility, special competition law treatment at the hands of
a telecommunications regulatory body as opposed to regular competition
law authorities makes less sense. A recent "White Book" commissioned by
the NRA on the TKG criticizes this situation: It suggests that the Cartel
Authority is better qualified to oversee the new telecommunications market
then is the NRA.293 The German Monopoly Commission has also ex-
pressed its concern that this separation could lead to divergence between
general and sector-specific competition law. It noted as well that the
overarching application of European competition law further complicates the
situation.294
292. This could lead to a conflict between German and EU law since, at least
theoretically, an enterprise could have greater than the 25% market share yet not qualify as
a market dominant enterprise under the Competition Law.
293. Sabine Ranft, TK-Markt: "Vom Monopol zum Wettbewerb" [Telecommunications
Market. "From Monopoly to Competition'], COMPUTERWOCHE, Nov. 22, 1996, at 36.
294. MoNoPoLKoMMIssIoN, DIE TELEKOMMUNIKATION IM WETrBEWERB, SONDER-
GUTACHTEN DER MONOPOLKOMMISSION [TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN COMPETITION, SPECIAL
REPORT OF THE MONOPOLY COMMISSION] 24, at 34 (1996).
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The White Book also repeats the argument set forth earlier that the
regulator overseeing competition in the telecommunications market must be
politically independent.295 This is particularly important given the Federal
Government's potentially conflicting goals of establishing and maintaining
a successful competitive market on one hand and of maximizing the
revenues it generates as it gradually sells shares of Telekom to the public
over the next several years on the other. Enormous sums of money are at
issue-Telekom 's annual turnover was DM 66 billion in 1995296 and its
initial public offering in November of 1996 raised $11.4 billion.297
Competitors have already expressed criticism that the liberal telecommuni-
cations regime the TKG is supposed to establish is being undercut by the
government's interest in Telekom " successful entry into the stock market
and continued health for purposes of further share sales. 298
The split between local and long-distance service in the U.S. market
has allowed the 1996 Act to take an incentive-based approach to diminish-
ing the risk of continued market dominance in the local markets. The BOCs
want to be able to enter the extremely lucrative long-distance service
market, 299 but to do so there must first exist substantial competition in the
local market (or at least the opportunity for it). Accordingly, the BOCs have
strong incentive to remove existing barriers to competitor entry in local
service because the rewards of successful competition in long-distance are
so great. There does not seem to be any comparable incentive system that
could work in the German market since Telekom does not remain excluded
from any segment of the market.
D. Interconnection
While the U.S. and German telecommunications markets are moving
from state-run or sanctioned monopolies to competition, it will take
considerable time and capital expenditures before competitors to the
incumbent systems have complete, alternate networks in place.3" In the
295. Ranft, supra note 293.
296. Sondermann, supra note 252.
297. Deutsche Telekom IPO a Success, TELECOMM. ALERT, Nov. 19, 1996, available in
LEXIS Market Library, IACNWS File.
298. Schuster, supra note 77, at 16. Peter Bross, Mannesmann-Eurokom's chief,
complained that regulatory decisions are not made without the agreement of the Finance
Minster. Id.
299. See The Lure of Distance, ECONO iST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 63.
300. It has been estimated that introducing competition in voice telephony will require
investment of between $800 to $1100 per subscriber. Dingwall, supra note 224, at 119
(citing Cable Strategies for Competitive Telephony: Assessing the Sprint/Cable Alliance,
YANKEEVISION CONSUMER COMM., Dec. 1994, at 1, 12.
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meantime, they will have to rely, to lesser or greater extents, upon
interconnection of their equipment and services with those of the incumbent
providers. Moreover, even with fully functioning alternative networks,
interconnection is necessary in order that the customers of each provider
will be able to communicate with the customers of other provid-
ers--something of particular importance in the multi-national EU telecom-
munications market.310' Accordingly, enacting effective, practical intercon-
nection requirements and rules is critical to establishing real competition in
telecommunications markets.302
1. Germany
a. The Law Leading to the TKG
Because of its status as a state-run monopoly, until recently, the
German telecommunications system did not have to confront interconnec-
tion issues, other than connecting its network with international long-
distance systems. With the advent of mobile systems, ISDN, and other
newer technologies offered at least in part by competitors to Telekom,
interconnection rules for those areas became necessary. However, local and
long-distance service, which remained in the hands of the state system, had
no interconnection requirements.
b. The TKG
In particular, the TKG is concerned that all networks interconnect.
"Interconnection" is defined as "network access establishing the physical
and logical connection of telecommunications networks to allow users
connected to different telecommunications networks to communicate
directly or indirectly."30 3 "Network access" is defined as
the physical and logical connection of terminal equipment or other
equipment to a telecommunications network or parts thereof as well as
the physical and logical connection of a telecommunications network
to another telecommunications network or parts thereof for the purpose
of obtaining access to functions of such telecommunications network
or to the telecommunications services provided via such network.304
All operators of telecommunications networks who occupy a market
dominant position in telecommunications markets are obligated to provide
301. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 1.5 (discussing how the problem of alternate
telephone systems during the infancy of the industry in the United States coupled with no
interconnection requirement led to the monopolization of the industry).
302. Sondhof & Theurer, supra note 4, at 186.
303. TKG § 3(24).
304. Id. § 3(9).
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competitors the opportunity to connect with their network or with parts of
the network.30 5  "Such access may be granted via connections provided
for all users (general network access) or by special connections (special
network access). 3 °6
All agreements concerning this interconnection must be based on
objective criteria, be understandable, and guarantee equal access to
telecommunications nets. All conditions contained within such agreements
must comply with the contents of the EC's Open Network Provisions
(ONP) Directive °7 and may not be designed to restrict competition. °s
Copies of interconnection agreements must be provided to the NRA which
will publish them in its official gazette.0 9 Where parties cannot come to
agreement on interconnection the NRA may set technical, operational, and
economic terms for the agreement. The Federal Government shall set
forth, with the consent of the Bundesrat, rules governing the granting of
special network access. 311
A network operator may only limit interconnection to the extent
allowed under EU directives." 2 A provider of telecommunications
services, which holds a market dominant position in the telecommunications
services market, must provide competitors with connection to those services
used internally and offered on the market and that are essential for the
provider to offer telecommunications service. If a network operator gives
itself better terms for connection to its own network than it does others,
305. Id. § 33(1). Earlier drafts contained broader language: All offerors of networks were
to be obligated to provide interconnection to their networks. See January Draft, supra note
3, § 34(1).
306. TKG § 35(1). The TKG also imposes another "interconnection" requirement, with
"Security Authorities." All commercial providers of telecommunications services must
maintain data on all customers, including numbers, names and addresses. Such data must be
maintained in such a manner that the NRA can retrieve data without the knowledge of the
provider. The NRA will provide such information as necessary to courts, prosecutors, and
other judicial authorities, to state and federal police for purposes of "averting danger", to
customs officials for criminal proceedings, and to federal and state constitution protection
authorities, the Federal Armed Forces Counter-Intelligence Office and the Federal
Intelligence Service. Id. § 90.
307. Id. § 35(2).
308. Id. § 38(1).
309. Id. § 35(2).
310. Id. § 37.
311. Id. § 35(5). The rules shall include framework agreement provisions and instructions
for obtaining approval from the NRA. Id. § 35(5).
Earlier drafts included broader language here, extending this rulemaking authority to
all connections, not just "special" connections. These rules were not to require the consent
of the Bundesrat. June Draft, supra note 3, at § 34(3). The Bundesrat had pressed for these
rules to require its consent. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 48.
312. ONP EG Nr. L 192, S.1 (art. 3, sentence 2).
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abuse of a market dominant position is assumed unless the operator
provides objectively justifiable reasons for the different treatment.313
Where a user demands a special interconnection to a network, the NRA
may investigate whether the user is sufficiently capable of making effective
use of the connection.3 14
Essentially, the basic rule regarding interconnection for market
dominant enterprises is that internal treatment must equal external treatment.
Otherwise, a market dominant provider that provides both licensed and
nonlicensed services could offer its own nonlicensed services access to
required services on better terms than it offers those required services to
competing providers of the nonlicensed service. Exceptions to this
requirement are only allowed where they are objectively justifiable.315
Where an enterprise violates interconnection requirements the NRA
must demand that the enterprise cease its objectionable conduct. The NRA
may then enjoin or prohibit the conduct in question and may declare
relevant contracts to be completely or in part invalid to the extent that the
enterprise abuses a market dominant position. 3 6 This authority is roughly
comparable to that provided in the Competition Law,3 17 except that it
allows enjoining of the conduct, rather than merely subjecting it to a
condition (for example, selling off a subsidiary).318
Where a market dominant provider is affiliated with other enterprises
such that they form a single enterprise within the meaning of the Competi-
tion Law, the NRA may exercise its authority over the single enterprise and
each of its parts.319
If a market dominant provider does not comply with European
Commission or Council ONP requirements, the NRA has authority to
demand that the enterprise cease its objectionable conduct, and may then
enjoin or prohibit the conduct, and may declare relevant contracts
completely or in part to be invalid.320 It is to be assumed that behavior
complying with requirements published in the Official Journal satisfies basic
313. TKG § 33(2). This opportunity to provide objective justification was added in the
June Draft. Abuse of a market dominant position was merely assumed in the earlier draft.
See January Draft, supra note 3, § 32(2).
314. TKG § 35(3).
315. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 32(1).
316. TKG § 33(2).
317. Competition Law, supra note 72, § 22(5).
318. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 32(2).
319. TKG § 33(3). Single enterprises within the meaning of § 23, sentence 1, line 2, and
sentences 2 & 3 of the Competition Law are covered here.
320. Id. § 34(1). The Bundesrat requested clarification in this area: The EU norms
should be applicable to all market participants. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 46.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
interconnection requirements.32' Where the EC has not published in its
Official Journal regulations concerning what constitutes compliance with
interconnection requirements, the NRA may require telecommunications
service providers to prove that they are in compliance with the law.322
2. The United States
a. The Law Leading to the Telecommunications Act of 1996
From the infancy of the telephone industry, interconnection was a
critical issue. Switching equipment was developed shortly after the
telephone's invention in 1876, when it immediately became clear that a
switching exchange was necessary to connect phones to other phones in the
same network.2 Moreover, small patchwork networks, even if each
customer could talk with other customers within a network, were obviously
much more effective if they allowed access to other networks.
With the expiration of the Bell Company's major patents on the
telephone in 1895, competition began to grow. By 1907, "independent"
companies, those not affiliated with Bell, owned nearly the same number
of telephone stations as Bell.324 However, because Bell owned the patents
to superior long-distance service technology and refused to sell equipment
or interconnection to anyone other than its affiliates, independents rapidly
went bankrupt or were acquired; because there was no requirement that Bell
provide interconnection to its superior long-distance network, a monopoly
was bom.32
5
Federal court cases that differentiated between telegraph owners-who
were required to provide interconnection to competitors-and telephone
companies, and the silence of the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, which defined
telecommunications companies as common carriers, established that there
was no interconnection requirement.326 The 1934 Act required intercon-
nection between the Bell system and other carriers only where the FCC
found "such necessary or desirable in the public interest.' '327 However,
given that the 1934 Act had as an underlying premise that the telephone
system was a natural monopoly,32 interconnection was not found to be
321. TKG § 34(2).
322. Id. § 34(3).
323. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 1.2.2.
324. Id. § 1.3.
325. Id.
326. See id. § 1.3.2 for detailed analysis.
327. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1995).
328. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 1.5. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 275,
621a (describing natural monopoly).
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in the public interest until much later, when the FCC and the courts began
taking a greater interest in competition.329 A degree of interconnection
was required as of 1976 when the FCC required domestic common carriers
to allow competitors to resell private line transmission services, including
long-distance services.33
Prior to the enactment of the 1996 Act, interconnection requirements
had been based on the FCC's changed attitude regarding what constitute's
the "public interest" per the 1934 Act and judicial decisions-most notably
the "essential facilities doctrine" and the AT&T and GTE consent
decrees.33" ' The MFJ required LECs to provide customers with access to
the IXCs of their choice and to provide equally efficient interconnections
between local customers and all IXCs. The MFJ called for functional rather
than technical equality in the interconnections.332 The ideal was that there
would be "equal access" to all IXCs; in other words, it would be as
easy-and involve dialing the same number of digits--to place a call
through AT&T as through any of its competitors. The intent was to
overcome the natural initial advantage AT&T possessed over its competitors
following divestiture since all the LECs were already connected to the
AT&T Long Lines system. Also, it was believed that by severing any
relationship between the LECs and AT&T, there would be no incentive for
the former to provide any more favorable connections to AT&T than to any
of its competitors.333
Equal access was phased in over several years to allow LECs time to
upgrade their equipment to be able to accomplish this goal.334 Alternative-
ly, customers-usually large businesses--could contract with competitive
access providers (CAPS) that would connect the customer with the IXC of
their choice or could enter a "special access" arrangement with the LEC
whereby the customer is connected to the LEC's central facility via
dedicated lines.3
35
In order to enhance competitive opportunity, the FCC also imposed
collocation rules on Tier 1 LECs-those with annual revenues of $100
million or more from regulated telecommunications operations 336-- that
required them to permit CAPs, IXCs, and others offering interstate service
329. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.4 (discussing development of interconnection
requirement).
330. Id. § 12.6; Marks, supra note 276, at 118.
331. KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 31.
332. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 5.2.
333. KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 54.
334. Id. at 34.
335. Id. at 36.
336. Id. at 37.
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to lease space in their facilities. This saved the interstate service providers
from the necessity of running lines from each customer to their own
premises."' The regulations required that collocation be either physical,
where the interstate provider's equipment is located on the LEC's facilities,
or virtual, where the provider's equipment is physically located adjacent to
the LEC facility. Virtual collocation connections must be both technically
and economically comparable to physical collocation connections.338
Because the BOCs and the few independents provided basic phone
service on an exclusive basis and therefore controlled the lines, for other
companies to be able to provide so-called "enhanced" services, like voice-
messaging, information, on-line and other services, required access to the
local phone lines. The Commission therefore set up the Open Network
Architecture (ONA) framework whereby such enhanced service providers
(ESP) could receive access to the basic telephone service necessary to
provide their enhanced services, such as switching, signaling, and
billing.339 Accordingly, subject to FCC and state regulatory oversight,
BOCs were to provide basic services to ESPs on an equal basis and for the
same tariffs as they provided such services to their own enhanced services.
Any basic service they provided to their own enhanced services had to be
made available to other ESPs, and they were required to respond promptly
to requests from ESPs for new or different basic services to match their
needs.340 Moreover, accounting rules requiring separation of regulated
from nonregulated services apply to prevent cross-subsidization.34'
b. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The 1996 Act inserts a new section 251 into the 1934 Act that
imposes an interconnection requirement on all telecommunications carriers.
Telecommunications carriers are defined broadly, as any provider of
telecommunication services. 342 All such carriers are required to "intercon-
nect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other
telecommunications carriers" and to refrain from installing any network
337. Id.
338. Id. at 38.
339. Id. at 65. The ONA model was developed in the FCC's Computer III decisions.
KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 12.5.
340. KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 66. The FCC instituted further technical requirements
in order to ensure that the quality, cost, and efficiency of the connections provided by the
BOCs to ESPs were virtually equal to those provided to their own services. However, the
equality standard was to be interpreted reasonably and in an efficient manner in order to
avoid wasteful attempts at absolute equality. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 9, § 11.7.1.
341. KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 68.
342. 47 U.S.C.A. § 3(a)(49) (West Supp. 1996).
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features and functions that fail to comply with the requirements of new
sections 255 and 256. 3" 3
The 1996 Act imposes special duties on LECs, both incumbents
344
and new entrants: (1) LECs may not prohibit resale of their services, (2)
they must provide telephone number portability, (3) they must provide
dialing parity, (4) they must allow access to rights-of-way and other
pathway points consistent with section 224 of the 1934 Act, and (5) they
must set up reciprocal compensation arrangements with other carriers.345
Incumbent LECs incur further duties that require them: to enter into
agreements with other carriers in good faith, to provide interconnection to
other carriers on the same terms and conditions they provide them
internally, 346 to offer access on an unbundled basis, to sell to telecommu-
nications carriers at wholesale rates the telecommunications services
provided at retail to subscribers, to provide reasonable public notice of
network changes, and to provide physical collocation, or virtual collocation
if the former is not practical.3 7 Exemptions are available from some
duties for rural telephone companies and other small LECs.34"
Incumbent LECs are also required to make public switched-network
infrastructure, technology, information, and telecommunications facilities
and functions available to qualifying carriers such as are necessary for
providing telecommunications services or access to information servic-
es.3"9 However, regulations implementing this requirement may not force
LECs to take action that is economically unreasonable or that is contrary to
the public interest.350 Moreover, the section permits but does not require
joint ownership of public switched network infrastructure and services by
or among LECs and qualifying telecommunications carriers.3 5'
Agreements for interconnection must be negotiated in good faith and
must be submitted to the relevant state commission for approval.352 The
state commission shall act as arbitrator for the resolution of differences in
negotiations and for compulsory arbitration.353 The FCC may step in
343. Id. § 251(a).
344. Defined in 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(h).
345. Id. § 251(b).
346. Id. § 251(c)(2)(D).
347. Id. § 251(c).
348. Id. § 251(f.
349. Id. § 259(a).
350. Id. § 259(b)(1).
351. Id. § 259(b)(2).
352. Id. § 252(a), (e).
353. Id. § 252(a).
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where the state commission fails to fulfill its obligations in this regard."5
3. Comparison and Conclusions
Essentially, both the German and U.S. systems aim for the same goals:
that all telecommunications equipment and services be interconnected and
that incumbent monopolies provide competitors with access to their services
on the same terms as they do to themselves. Not surprisingly, both the
German and U.S. systems have very similar rules to these ends.
In the TKG, while all providers must set up their systems to be able
to interconnect with all others, the requirement that competitors be able to
use an existing network applies to market dominant providers, in this case
Telekom. Similarly, the pre-1996 Act system in the United States provided
that all LECs were obliged to offer access on equal terms to all competitors
who supplied telecommunications service other than basic local service, for
which the LECs held a monopoly. Now, the 1996 Act provides the same
requirement as the TKG: that all telecommunications carriers interconnect
with all others.
In the TKG, "market dominant provider" basically refers to Telekom
given the present state of the industry, but the concept is rather open, at
least theoretically leaving open the possibility that another provider could
take Telekom's place. By contrast, the 1996 Act's special rules concerning
competition in the local markets refers to the "incumbent" LECs. Accord-
ingly, the 1996 Act seems less concerned with the possibility of new
entrants becoming dominant in the local exchange market.
E. Rights-of-Way
Utilities in general, like gas, water, and electricity providers, must
supply their product to consumers. This involves a complex system of
networks carrying each item across long distances to its final destination.
Supply lines often must cross federal, state, municipal and private land. The
rights to use of paths must be obtained in a fair manner that offers equal
access for all market participants.
Establishing and maintaining a network's right of way system is an
enormous undertaking. In the last 15 years in the United States, IXCs have
spent many billions of dollars building, maintaining, and upgrading their
networks, including building and upgrading networks, obtaining local
zoning approvals and waivers, and obtaining access to rights-of-way.15
354. Id. § 252(e)(5).
355. Dingwall, supra note 226, at 129.
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1. Germany
a. The Law Leading to the TKG
Telekom s access to public traffic paths for the purposes of laying its
telecommunications lines is authorized in section 1 of the Telegraph Route
Law.356 It may not be charged for its access and does not require further
authorization from municipalities for its access. Private telecommunications
providers--those setting up alternative infrastructures-must enter into
individual contracts with municipalities and other public entities concerning
access and charges. Accordingly, Telekom enjoys a substantial advantage at
this time over other telecommunications enterprises,3 ' though, as dis-
cussed below, this will change once other enterprises obtain the right to
establish networks.
Current law governing Telekom access to private property for purposes
of laying and maintaining its network is governed by private law and
consists of contractual relationships between the various parties. Here, both
Telekom and fully private enterprises are on the same footing.
Similarly, both private users and Telekom must enter into individual
contracts with the federal government, the states, and municipalities
concerning concurrent use of pre-existing paths, such as tunnels and pipes,
for telecommunications lines that are owned by the public entity.35s
b. The TKG
The TKG bestows on the federal government authorization to use
public trafficways for telecommunications lines that are for public purposes.
This authority is necessary to ensure the provision of full coverage of
telecommunications services in accordance with the requirements of article
87(f) of the German Constitution. 9 The government may not be charged
for this use so long as it does not constitute a lasting encroachment on the
normal use of the infrastructure.3' 6 In order that all enterprises engaged
356. Telegraphenwegegesetz [Telegraph Route Law] (TWG) § 1, v. 24.4.1991 (BGBI. I
S.1053).
357. Sven-Erik Heun, Wegerechte [Rights-of-Way], SPEECH AT THE EUROFORUM CONFER-
ENcE, supra note 51, at 2.
358. Id. at 12.
359. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, at 33.
360. Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) § 50(1), v. 1.8.1996 (BGBI. I S.1 120). The issue
of charges for use of rights-of-way remained extremely contentious. See Anh6rung zum
neuen TK-Gesetz und Diskussion im Bundesrat, 3 (reporting continued debate over this
question in Bundestag Committee hearings). Here, the Bundesrat recommended a substantial
change: It would have eliminated the government's right to cost-free use of traffic
infrastructure. Rather, the entity who carries the burden of maintaining the infrastructure
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in providing telecommunications networks may compete on an equal
footing, the federal government transfers this right to all telecommunications
license holders.36" ' Telecommunications lines, however, must be laid in
such a manner that they comply with existing safety laws, public policy,
and technical requirements. The laying of new lines or the alteration of pre-
existing lines requires agreement of the authority responsible for construct-
ing and maintaining public ways [Trdger der Wegebaulast].362 Approval
of an application to lay or alter lines may only be withheld on technical
grounds.363
Where lines are laid above ground, the interests of the license holder,
the infrastructure maintainer, and the city planning authorities must all be
balanced.3" Some conflicts may arise between municipal authorities
seeking to limit construction in their areas and those establishing telecom-
munications networks because the balancing of interests requirement does
not apply to the laying of underground cables.365 Those seeking to lay
would have a right to claim compensation for use. The Bundesrat argued that the interests
of communities were not properly considered in the provisions of the TKG. Cost-free access,
based on the Bundespost's prior cost-free access, is not appropriate because the DBP's
access was based upon its special status as a state-run monopoly. Accordingly, after the full
privatization of the telecomiunications system after January 1, 1998, the status of telecom-
munications carriers should be viewed as comparable to that of energy providers who must
pay for their use of traffic infrastructure in providing service. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note
76, § 61. However, an executive from Telekom argued in response that the comparison with
energy providers is inapt: telecommunications providers bear various universal service and
interconnection burdens which benefit the public that energy providers do not, and cost-free
use of the infrastructure is appropriate for provision of such service. Hans-Willi Hefekauser,
Telekom im Fairen Wettbewerb? [Telekom in Fair Competition?], SPEECH AT THE
EUROFORUM CONFERENCE, supra note 51, at 7.
The Bundesrat also sought to strike the word "lasting" [dauernd] from the Draft in
order to emphasize that the use of traffic infrastructure is not to be encroached upon by
telecommunications use per the TKG. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 60.
361. TKG § 50(2). See Schiltz & Esser-Welli6, supra note 213 at 587.
362. TKG § 50(3). In its comments, the Bundesrat argues that this approval requirement
is too vague given the multiple legitimate interests that would be implicated in such
questions. Accordingly, the Bundesrat recommended that approval authority be placed
explicitly in the hands of the relevant state authority because it has better experience and
understanding of local needs than would a federal regulator. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note
76, § 62. Moreover, the state authority would have a right to charge fees for its decision-
making in this area. Id. § 63.
363. TKG § 50(3). The Bundesrat sought that this section provide that approval be
granted where the entity bearing maintenance duties agrees; where legitimate public interests
have been properly considered; and where the private rights of third parties do not stand in
the way. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 62.
364. TKG § 50(3).
365. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 49. Hiltl discusses a potential conflict
between licenseholders and the federal government on one side, and local communities on
the other, where the latter want to maintain significant limits on construction of and upgrades
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telecommunications lines may be required to satisfy technical requirements,
but such requirements must be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.3
In cases where a licenseholder is the entity responsible for maintaining
the public way, or if one of the two holds an ownership stake of 25 percent
or more of the other,367 then, for purposes of providing approval, the
NRA stands in for the latter entity where another licenseholder seeks to
make use of that pathway. 68 In cases where an entity has a right under
section 50 to utilize traffic infrastructure, but where added construction or
alteration of existing networks are either impossible or prohibitively
expensive, then the entity has a right to demand that the existing network
tolerate concurrent use of its pathway. This is only possible where the
concurrent use is reasonable and does not require the pathway owner to
perform additional construction on the path. Reasonable charges for
concurrent use may be demanded.169 The intent of this section is that
decisions regarding establishing independent lines versus making use of pre-
existing lines should be market driven; where additional construction is
wastefully expensive, parties should reach agreements for concurrent
use.
370
Those using traffic infrastructure must avoid interference with
infrastructure maintenance and must minimize their encroachment on the
primary purpose of the infrastructure. Where use increases maintenance
costs, then the user must pay those additional costs. Moreover, a user
performing construction work must return the infrastructure to proper
working order as quickly as possible, unless the entity responsible for
maintaining the infrastructure chooses to repair the path itself. The user
must pay for any additional costs imposed on the path maintainer and must
pay for any damages caused to an existing telecommunications line.371
A telecommunications line must be altered or removed when it
to networks as a means of avoiding having their streets tom up too regularly. Some
communities have laws limiting excavation to every three or five years. Hiltl & GroBmann,
supra note 7, at 175.
366. TKG § 50(3).
367. As defined in § 23, sentence 2 or 3 of the Competition Law. TKG Legislative
Report, supra note 3, § 49(4).
368. TKO § 50(4).
369. Id. § 51.
370. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 50. The Bundesrat sought that concurrent
use be explicitly preferred over the laying of new lines. The goal was to limit burdens on
existing infrastructure, i.e. to minimize the amount of excavation necessary. Bundesrat
Opinion, supra note 76, § 65.
371. TKG § 52(3). Paragraphs 51-55 merely reflect pre-existing law. Paragraphs 51
through 55 correspond to §§ 2-6 TelWegG, respectively. TKG Legislative Report, supra note
3, §§ 51-55.
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substantially encroaches upon the use of the traffic infrastructure, or when
the path's purposes are impaired. When traffic infrastructure is removed the
authorization to use the path for telecommunications purposes expires.372
One who constructs a telecommunications line must avoid creating
difficulties for those who hold pre-existing special installations, those
"serving to maintain public ways, canalisation, water and gas lines, tracks,
electrical installations, and the like. 373 The telecommunications provider
must pay any additional costs its line incurs upon pre-existing installation
operators' pathways. The license holder may only demand that a special
installation operator make changes to existing lines where the telecommuni-
cations line otherwise could not be established and where the purposes of
the original installation may still be fulfilled. However, where establishing
the telecommunication lines would subject the special installation operator
to unreasonably high costs, the line may not be established.374 Conversely,
where special installations are established after a telecommunications line
is put in, they must be established in such a way so as not to disturb the
telecommunications line.3 75 However, where a telecommunications line
precedes establishment of a special installation that is in the public interest,
particularly for economic or traffic purposes, the telecommunications user
must pay the costs for any necessary alterations to or removal of its own
lines.376 The telecommunications line operator must also bear its own
costs where the construction of a special installation requires protective
upgrades to the telecommunications line.377 Where an existing telecommu-
nications line serves areas other than the local region, it may only be
removed (based on special installation needs) when it can be moved to
another location without incurring disproportionately high costs.3 78
Where an entity holding the burden of maintaining traffic infrastruc-
ture transfers its rights to a third party that has no such burden, the
transferring entity must reimburse a telecommunications user for the added
costs involved, including changes to and added protection to the line.379
Where an existing telecommunications line is disturbed by the later addition
of a special installation that is not designated as being in the public interest,
the telecommunications provider is entitled to reimbursement for the costs
372. TKG § 53(2).
373. Id. § 55(1).
374. Id. § 55(1).
375. Id. § 56(1).
376. Id. § 56(2).
377. Id. § 56(3).
378. Id. § 56(2).
379. Id. § 56(4).
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incurred.38
An owner of property that is not a public trafficway may not block the
use of, construction of, or improvements to telecommunications lines where
the property is already used for telecommunications purposes or where the
added use does not or only immaterially impedes the use of the property on
a short-term basis.38' However, the landowner may demand pecuniary
compensation for costs involved in the use of the property and loss of
income derived therefrom, where such costs and losses exceed that which
would normally be associated with the operation of the telecommunications
line. Moreover, for ongoing use of the property for telecommunications
purposes, where the property was not previously used for telecommunica-
tions purposes, non-recurring pecuniary compensation is available s.3 2 This
paragraph is intended to assist new private telecommunications enterprises
in competing with public utilities who already possess rights-of-way upon
which they could lay their own cable. It is believed that because public
utilities had previously obtained cost-free rights to lay cable across private
land, new entrants would be unfairly disadvantaged if they were required
to pay market rates for the same privilege.8 3 Such an imbalance would
inhibit competition. Claims arising concerning rights-of-way have a
limitations period of two years, beginning at the end of the year in which
the claim arises.3 4
2. The United States
a. The Law Leading to the Telecommunications Act of 1996
While the federal government holds considerable authority under the
1934 Act, the states may also regulate and control telecommunications
entities. Moreover, a state may delegate this power to cities and other
political subdivisions and properly constituted boards or commissions. 8
The 1934 Act, as modified by the Pole Attachment Act, grants to the
FCC power to regulate pole attachments by utilities. However, in practice,
issues concerning rights are predominantly played out at the state and local
380. Id. § 56(5).
381. Id. § 57(1). The Bundesrat sought to change this section to strengthen the rights of
private land owners. Under the Bundesrat proposal, a private land owner could only be
required to provide access where his or her land was already being used for telecommunica-
tions-related purposes. Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 76, § 68. The Bundesrat also ques-
tioned whether these provisions concerning use of private land are constitutional. Id. § 69.
382. TKG § 57(2).
383. TKG Legislative Report, supra note 3, § 56.
384. TKG § 58.
385. 74 AM. JUL. 2D Telephones and Telegraphs § 19 (1974).
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
level. 86 The federal government may grant franchises, and a state may
not interfere with such a franchise, though states and municipalities have the
right to receive compensation for use.
387
State regulation of rights-of-way varies among the fifty states. By way
of example, again, California law is examined. In California, the holder of
a state franchise to operate a telephone company is entitled to construct its
lines along and upon public roads and highways, along or across waters or
land within the state, and to erect poles and other devices for supporting its
lines as necessary, so long as such does not interfere with the use of the
streets, waters, or land.38 ' The right to use public streets and other places
entails a commensurate obligation to provide adequate service in the area
served. This includes an obligation to extend service to newly developed
areas in response to demand.389 Moreover, like all utilities, telephone
service providers must provide services and maintain facilities so as to
promote safety and the convenience of patrons, employees, and the
public. 39
The holder of a state franchise to use streets and other public places
for telephone services need not also obtain a franchise from local authori-
ties. However, the holder may not exercise its franchise rights in such a way
as to unreasonably encroach on the use of the streets or other public places.
Moreover, a telephone company is subject to an implied obligation to bear
the costs of relocating its facilities based upon a proper governmental use
of the streets.391
A telephone company right-of-way over private land is usually
characterized as an easement appurtenant to the land, absent another
agreement by the parties. Moreover, the company has the right to condemn
any property necessary for construction and maintenance of telephone
lines.392 With these rights comes the commensurate duties to repair and
maintain the lines.
b. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The 1996 Act's treatment of rights-of-way is sparse. It amends section
224 of the 1934 Act which regulates "pole attachments," defined as "any
attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications
386. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1995).
387. 59 CAL. JUR. 3D Telephones and Telegraphs § 3 (1980).
388. 59 CAL. JUR. 3D Telephones and Telegraphs § 5.
389. Id. § 7.
390. Id. § 13.
391. Id. § 8
392. Id. § 19
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service to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a
utility."393 Parties may negotiate rates, terms, and conditions for attach-
ments to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way. For cases where the
parties cannot reach agreement to ensure that utilities charge just, reason-
able, and nondiscriminatory rates for pole attachments, the FCC is to
prescribe regulations to govern charges for pole attachments necessary for
the provision of telecommunications services.3"
3. Comparison and Conclusions
A fundamental issue underlying rights-of-way questions is who shall
pay for the installation, maintenance, and related costs associated with
laying telecommunications lines on public rights-of-way. Should all
community members bear such costs, or only those actually using a
particular line or service? Given universal service, interconnection,
emergency services communications access, and other generalized
requirements, it is not always possible to clearly distinguish between those
who do and do not make use of available telecommunications services and
networks.
To ensure a truly competitive market requires attention to the
differences between those entities possessing pre-existing lines and those
that would lay new lines. In Germany, Telekom has had the benefit of free
access to public rights-of-way for its lines, as have the rail system and the
energy providers who are emerging as primary competitors to Telekom. By
contrast, new entrants do not have the benefit of pre-existing lines.
Accordingly, the TKG provides to new entrants cost-free access to public
traffic ways to the extent that the lines do not encroach upon normal use of
the infrastructure. Moreover, both the TKG and the 1996 Act seek to avoid
wasteful duplication by establishing mechanisms by which regulators may
facilitate agreements between parties for concurrent use of existing
pathways.
With regard to access to private land, the issue becomes more complex
in both the United States and Germany as the telecommunications market
moves from a publicly operated or sanctioned utility model to a private
model. In both countries, the telephone companies have had access to
private land, with or without compensation in different circumstances, for
their operations. However, arguments for special treatment vis-d-vis private
393. 47 U.S.C. 224(a)(4) (as amended by section 703 of 1996 Act). The definition of
"utility" is amended to include LECs. Id.
394. 47 U.S.C.A. 703(7) (West Supp. 1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. 224 by adding new
section (e)(1)).
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land have lost force: Why should a private, profit-driven telecommunica-
tions company have any more claim to the use of Mrs. Smith's or Herr
Schmidt's land than, say, the neighboring supermarket that desires to
expand its parking lot to attract more customers? The community's interest
in benefits such as availability of universal service, interconnection of
telecommunications networks, and emergency services communications
access provide a basis for some degree of special treatment. And again,
there is the need to provide new market entrants with similar opportunities
as those possessed by pre-existing telecommunications entities.
The TKG approach seeks to balance between private property
ownership interests and telecommunications enterprise access to land. The
TKG provides telecommunications companies guaranteed access to private
land only to the extent that use would have no substantial impact on the use
of the private land, or where the land is already used for telecommunica-
tions purposes.3 95 However, this access to private land may meet constitu-
tional challenges based on private property ownership rights 9 6 and
"substantial impact" has yet to be defined in practice.
At least in theory, there should be less of a need for laying of new
lines for competition in the United States than in Germany because the
prime competitors to incumbent LECs are expected to be the cable
television companies: multiple long-distance networks have been in place
for years and the vast majority of homes in the United States are already
connected to cable TV lines. More modem cable connections laid in
anticipation of eventual competition in local telephony should already be
relatively ready to be used to provide alternate service by cable companies.
However, given various technical difficulties, and the age of some existing
cable lines, access to alternative local service providers will not come
quickly or cheaply in all regions.3 97
IV. CONCLUSION
The opening of local service to competition in the United States
represents a major upheaval in the market---particularly with the entry of
cable television companies into telecommunications service provision and
vice-versa. However, the truly radical change is to take place in Germany,
where virtually the entire system will be transformed at the stroke of
midnight on December 31, 1997. With an estimated $80 billion at stake in
395. A similar rule appears to exist in older American law. See 74 AM. JUR. 2D
Telephones and Telegraphs § 15 n.12 (citing Ft. Worth & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. S.W. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 71 S.W. 270 (Tex. 1903)).
396. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
397. See Dingwall, supra note 276, at 111.
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the German telecommunications market by the year 2000, and given the
dramatic liberalization taking place in that market, companies from around
the world have been positioning themselves to most effectively compete in
Germany in 1998 and on into the twenty-first century. Of course, the full
practical effects of this radical change will not be felt from one day to the
next. It will take considerable time for new networks to be established and,
as importantly, for consumers to become aware of and try these networks
and to enjoy the benefits of a competitive environment.
German regulators must also come to terms with a completely new
role: Overseeing a competitive market consisting of a broad array of
telecommunications service providers. This is in sharp contrast to its current
role of overseeing Telekom and a few other providers, and to its prior role
of both regulating and operating the entire system.
Both the TKG and the 1996 Act are responses to international and
domestic political and market pressures toward greater liberalization of
telecommunications markets. Accordingly, for all the differences between
the existing systems in each country, it is not surprising that the intended
results of each law are very similar. However, because of the substantial
differences between the existing systems, "full competition" in each market
will undoubtedly take different forms. The challenge facing both regulators
and market participants is to anticipate and to adapt to those different forms.

